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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This paper developed from the topic considered in the
third chapter--the Anglo-American good offices mission to
France in 1958, headed up by Robert Murphy of the United
States.

It was a mission that has received only passing

attention by most commentators on American and French affairs
if they mention it at all.
attention here?

Why then give it any special

There are several reasons that one ma.y want

to recall the Murphy-Beeley trip.
mati~

As the last major diplo

exchange with France during the Fourth Republic, it

emphasizes the degree to which Fr9nch-American relations had
disintegrated before de Gaulle returned to public office.

It

indicates as well the sources of French hostility at that
time.

In both cases, an attempt has been made here to cor

rect misjudgements which Americans have tended to make:

the

first a misjudgement which still seems to persist, that the
history of Franco-American discord begins and ends with
de Gaulle;. the second a contention consistently put forward
by government officials at the time and by Murphy in partic
ular, that French hostility to United States policy emanated
.entirely from Communist quarters.
in this last case is overwhelming.

Evidence to the contrary
While hostility was in

2

evidence on the extreme Left, it was primarily individuals
and parties on the kight and Right-Center who lead the
opposition, and I can only conclude that Murphy and other
leaders in Washington were more concerned with perpetuating
a myth than with facing honestly the real reasons for French
despair.

France was discovering that she existed in an

American world and it was not a pleasant revelation.

Yet

Washington would not admit to this general French concern,
and it ignored, for example, de Gaulle's warning in 1958
.tbat NATO would have to be revamped.
seems to have been so convinced

th~t

The United States
hostility to its pol

icies could only be the result of Communist agitation or of
pers~nal

hostility (i.e., de Gaulle) that it remained blithe

fully ignorant of the antipathy converging from diverse
sources.

Such a widespread opposition was incompatible with

a conspiracy interpretation of the sources of hostility.
Thus, aspects of the 1958 good offices mission go
beyond the specific event and my main concern is with these
broader implications of the mission for Franco-American re
lations.

Unfortunately, the

mi~sion

reflects a poverty of

American diplomacy, both in style and content, that in many
ways appears typical of the Communist-obsessed postwar
American foreign policy rather than an aberration.

I attempt

to analyze this situation in the latter part of Chapter Three
and in Chapter Four •

3
The second chapter, emphasizing French affairs in par
ticular, discusses the development of Franco-American rela
tions up to 1958.

The war and the period that followed

brought a shift in relations between the two countries--from
one of a traditional, nodding friendship before the war to
one of real involvement afterward.
lations began with the war.

One might say that re

The French came to understand

American attitudes and (probably to a lesser extent)
Americans the views of the French, and it cannot be said
that the two countries were as charmed with one another as
they might have anticipated.

The early postwar period was

one of adjustment for both countries.

Roles had shifted:

the United States had been brought to the forefront while
France had virtually been reduced to insignificance.
~as

It

from these positions that France and America began their

first close peacetime association.

'The United States had

only to learn to accept a position of world leadership, but
France could not forget the role of leadership which had been
hers and could not rest until that position had been re
gained.

Conflict would unavoidably have followed a policy

of the United States vis-~-vis France which. assumed the new
positions of France and the United States to represent the
postwar status guo, which assumed American leadership and
French subservience to that leadership, not for a specific
period but indefinitely.

And that is just the policy

Washington unerringly pursued.

CHAPTER II
FRANCE AND THE MODERN CHALLENGE
"The stalemate societyll is a label that has been used
by Stanley Hoffmann to describe the equilibrium of the Third
Republic.

Not by chance or by default was Parliament

"supreme but immobile"--this was the first political system
since the Revolution that had effectively adapted itself to
French society, striking a balance between those who per
ennially stressed the need for authority and those who
expressed fear of authority.

"What the stalemate society

needed was state protection, not domination; it wanted an
instrument, not a master.

...

It was a state wedded to

the social status gU2 • • • ,,1
Maintenance of the status guo in Francets economic
and international positions was a prerequisite for the sur
vival of the stalemate society; but in the period between the
two world wars, shifts in both areas brought about its
disintegration.

With the growth of industry and the

lStanley Hoffmann, et al., "Paradoxes of the French
Political Community," In Search of France (New York: Harper
~ Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 3, 14, 15. See also David·
Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (4th ed.; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 191-92.
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problems created by the depression, dynastic and clerical
.
. and f'1nanC1a
. 1 1ssues.
.
2
1ssues
were rep 1 ace d b- y econom1C

The

Left, by taking an active part in numerous strikes, mainly
over wages and working conditions, disrupted the Center
coalition.

Dissenters trom French parliamentarism rapidly

grew in strength.
had

pr~viously

Anti-Republican forces on the Right which

tolerated the parliamentary regime "now merged

their anti-Communism into their

anti~Republicanism,

to clamour tor a more authoritarian regime_H)

and began

On the Left,

where more state planning and greater economic socialization
was demanded, calls for a stronger government were repeated. 4
During the interwar period, one problem eclipsed all
others in the area of foreign affairs, made all others
trivial by comparison, and that was "the German problem."
~he

First World War, far from solving the German problem,

made it ultimately more acute.
(T)he old balance of power,·which formerly
did something to restrain Germany, had broken down.
Russia had withdrawn; Austria-Hungary had vanished.
Only France and Italy remained, both inferior in
man-power and still more i~ economic resources,
both exhausted by the war.
G

.,

..

2Thomson, Democ~acy in France Since 1870, p. 182.

)~., p. 195.
4aoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political
Community," pp. )0-31.
5A• J.P. Taylor, l.he OrigiI!.L.9f the Second World War
(2nd. ed.; Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
1961), pp. 28-29.
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Although greatly damaged by war and limited for the present
by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany nevertheless remained
the greatest power in Europe.

While France looked for

security, the Americans and the British, "inclined to think
that they had done their work,,,6 withdrew their troops from
France and reduced their armies to the peacetime level.
American withdrawal would have mattered less had Great
Britain, France and Italy stayed in agreement.

But Italy

tailed to contribute what little she might have, and
Britain, while remaining closely associated with France,
disagreed with her on the potential threat of Germany.
They (the British) tended to regerd talk of the
German danger as historical romanticism, which
indeed it was in the immediate present. The French
ob'session wi th se~uri ty seemed not so much ex.agger
ated as mistaken.of
With that analysis, British sentiment in the thirties moved
back towards isolationism.
Forced in this manner to single-handedly follow a
policy of keeping European peace, France assumed an undertak
ing she could not fulfill.

Neither in spirit nor in military

strength was she up to the task.
these internal and

exte~nal

The tensions created by

developments

ha~

several divisive

effects on France, all of which contributed to the breakdown
of the Republic and helped to prepare France for defeat in
1940.
6 Ibid ., p. 34.
7 Ibid ., p. 38.
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First, the depression and the collapse of Versailles
-

shook the French loose from their general complacency and
prompted a widespread questioning of France's power, her
claim to status and her traditional values.

Both on the

Left and on the Right, many became convinced that war would
only destroy or further weaken a nation that had already
fallen behind the stream of history, and they took refuge in
pacifism.

In the face of overcommitment, French public

opinion, introverted from the beginning, turned defensive;
the defensive posture of the Maginot Line stood as a military
symbol for the wider mental outlook of all those who feared
a permanent decline of

t~e

French position.

German reparation payments must

b~

Here, too,

counted as a symbol.

France got virtually nothing out of reparations but sus
picion, moral blame, and international hostility for having
ever demanded them.

To this, the French reacted by losing

faith in their leaders and in themselves.

"Reparations

fixed the French in an attitude of sullen, but rather hope
less, resistance • • ••

(They) did almost as much damage
to democracy in France as in Germany itself. nS
STaylor, The Origins of the Second World War, pp. 48
49. On the questioning of values, see Hoffmann, "Paradoxes
of the French Political Community," pp. 24-26, 30-32;
B. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed Path: French Social
Thought in the Years of Desperation. 1930-1960 (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), 2-6, 8, 15-18. On the
extent of introversionism and pacifism, see Jean-Baptiste
'Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945,"
in In Search ~f France, pp. 306-18.
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Secondly, the political system fell into confusion.
The National Assembly bad the power to deal with the problems
that arose, but
most French parties had not been created around the
issue of economic and social balance or around for
eign affairs, since these had been the pillars of
French consensus. Consequently, when they became
the major political issues, the parties proved both
incapable of agreeing on coherent measures and un
able to get their own members to agree. 9
Finally, lacking the spirit and the military strength
to keep peace in Europe, France turned to Britain.

"The main

feature of French foreign policy from 1936 onwards was its
complete subservience to British policy.,,10
policy?

Was this a wise

A. J. P. Taylor argues throughout The Origins of the

Second World War that Hitler had no intention of making war
with the West.

His argument is reinforced by an economist,

Burton H. Klein, whose statistics in Germany's Economic Pre-=
parations for War demonstrate that Hitler's rearmament pro
gram did not proceed at anything like the rate that has
usually been assumed or that Hitler himself claimed.

Rather

than planning a war with the West, they believe Hitler
expected to extend German territory piecemeal through &
series of small wars in the East.

Above all, he intended

to succeed without provoking a great war.

"The wa.r of 1939,11

9Hoffmann, IIParadoxes ,of the French Political Commu
nity," p. 25. See also ~., pp. 21, 26; Thomson, Democracy
in France Since 1870, pp. 182~84, 191-92.
10Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870,. p. 205.
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Taylor claims, "far from being premeditated, was a mistake,
the result on both sides of diplomatic blunders."11
It was Britain's revolutionary new policy of solid
and indiscriminate alliance with Poland--and this commitment
made without first consulting France 12 __that caught Hitler
by surprise and left him with little choice but to advance
on the Yest.

As for France, she was dragged into war in the

wake of British decisions.
The Third Republic had not wanted war, but its leaders
~ere

unable to develop a policy for maintaining peace and

they were equally incapable of developing a realistic
strategy of defense.

The military defeat was above all a

defeat in strategy; only in the number of planes did Germany
hold a great material advantage over France. 13 This kind of
defeat Charles de Gaulle had foreseen.

In his most important

book on military strategy, Vers l'Armte de M~tier,published
in 1934 while he was secretary-general of the National
11Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 212 •
.See also ~., pp. 210-11, 280, 284-86; Burton H. Klein,"
German's Economic Pre arations for War (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959 , pp. 3-27.
12Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 205.
13Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945," p. 323: "The number of planes at the disposal of the
state in 1937 was 450 for France as opposed to 4,320 for
" Germany. tI Duroselle takes this quote from Alfred Sauvy in
LtExpress, April 20, 1960. See also Klein, Preparations for
War, pp. 17-18, 19-20; The War l·femoirs of Charles de Gaulle:
The Call to Honour, 1940-1942, trans. by Jonathan Griffin,
I (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), 36."
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Defense Council in Paris, de Gaulle argued that an immobile
defensive strategy would not be the character of the next
war.

His plan called for a mechanized force of tanks and

planes.capable of rapid and direct attack.

Although aware

of de Gaulle's book, the French High Command did not share
his viewpoint since it went in diametric opposition to the
entire'defensive strategy which they had planned for France.
Unfortunately his book was more successful in Germany where
Hitler had it read to him and insisted that all his chief
advisors study it.14
Marc Bloch, the French

histo~ian

who participated in

the war and wrote of the defeat soon afterward, saw the
failure of French strategy as a sign of a more serious in
tellectual failing in leadership:

"Our leaders, or those

who acted for them, were incapa.ble of thinking in terms of a
~

war.

In other words, the German triumph was, essential

ly, a triumph of intellect--and that is what makes it so
peculiarly serious.,,15

This was de Gaulle's conclusion as

well when he wrote that tithe metronome of the French High
Command never failed to beat several measures behind.,,16
14Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle,
Pree France and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1964), pp. 11-33.
15Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat, trans. by Gerard Hopkins
(New York: Y. Y. Nort.on & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 36.
16Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre, I, 34-35,
quoted in White, Seeds of Discord, p. 46.

x.

J,

j
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Unquestionably the war years were a divisive experience
for the French.

Yithinthese divisions,

wer~

there any

significant forces of unity and rejuvenation to be found
that had been sorely lacking eyen before the war a,I1d that
would be necessary for France to adapt herself to the postwar
,world?

This is an important but also difficult question.

It is hard to contend with because, as Alexander Werth
suggests, "Few things are more difficult to decipher than the
minds of Frenchmen during the 1940-4: period'."

Mental reser

vations were bound to be held in check, perspectives shifted,
and moreover the period has been shrouded in myth.

Resis

tance men magnified the role of the underground and gladly
endorsed the myth that nearly all of France was rlsistante
in 1944.

Later the Right unfairly "debunked" the myth

through their treatment of the French Forces of the
Interior. 17
The Vichy regime cannot take credit for unifying
French attitudes.

Rather, a trend in just the opposite

direction is indicated by the course of events.

In the first

shock of disaster the parliamentary government of the Third
Republic seemed finally discredited and the anti-Republicans
of the Right won an easy victory.

Marshall pttain, whose

reputation was based upon military achievements in the First
17Alexander Werth, France. 1940-1955;(London:
Hale, Ltd., 1956), pp. 4, 7.

Robert
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World War, became the last regularly appointed cabinet head
of the Third Republic, and he was immediately endowed "with
practically unlimited monarchical powers. n18

Among the Vichy

politioians, as well as among Frenchmen in general, his
support was virtually unanimous in July 1940.

"Almost

every parliamentarian was ready to entrust France to pttain
at least for the immediate future, and many were prepared to
see a permanent shift to authoritarian government. n19
Little sympathy was to be found for the system responsible
for failure; even the resistance movements voiced a common
critique of French parliamentarism.~O
But unity passed quickly.

The French had understood at

first only the need for a strong leader but soon they became
more discriminating.

The famous meeting between pltain and

Bitler marks the beginning of a steady decline in Vichy sup
port and a continual rise of those who could no longer accept
the Marshallts compromise. 21
Neither can Vichy claim to have maintained inner unity,
to have held to a single set of objectives vis-~-vis Germany
181bid ., 32, 39-40.
19GordoD Wright, France in Modern Times: 1760 to the
Present (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1960), p. 511.
See also Werth, France, 1940-1955, pp. 6, 30-32.
20Hottmann, "Para.doxes ot the French Political
Community , It pp. 30-31 •.
21 Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945," p. 326.
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during the war period.

Seyera1 phases are distinguishable.

Before December 1940, while

Vice~Premier

Pierre Lave1 was in

control, the keynote was defeatism and some collaboration.
Between February 1941 and April 1942, under Admiral Jean
Dar1an's direction, Vichy worked to eliminate all remaining
traces of the parliamentary Republic through the "National
Revolution" program, and to turn France into Germany's
closest ally.

Dar1an "reached--or rather, tried to reach-

the peak of Franco-German co11aboration.,,22

After April,

vith the new balance created by American entry into the war,
Vichy--once again under Lave1 f s contro1--retreated toward
attentisme and continued in that policy until January 1944
when Nazi collaborators from Paris were forced into the
Government.

Thereafter Vichy represented the forces of pro
Germanism and opposition to it hardened. 23
The Vichy regime, rather than uniting France through'
the "National Revolution," divided it and drove support
away.

"There was a steady drift away of national opinion and

~ee1ing

from defeatism and reluctant collaboration towards

attentisme, and from attenti~me towards resistance."24
As a political body, the French Resistance never
achieved the structural u.ni ty of Vichy.

Most of the

r

22Werth, France, 1940-195l, p. 79.
23Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870, pp. 217-20.
24lli.!!., p. 219.
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movements were originally free of politics, beginning as
spontaneous resistance to the enemy, and that is what they
remained as far as the actual combatants were concerned.
Leaders of the various movements, however, gradually dirtied
themselves with politics.

By the end of 1942 it appears

that the Communist organized National Front was attempting

.

to coordinate resistance movements under its own leadership •
This they were unable to do, but Gaullist agents succeeded
where Communist efforts failed when all major underground
movements and political parties were welded into a nation
wide federation, the National Resistance Council, on May 27,
1943.

Despite the continuance of occasional friction

between the underground and de Gaulle's headquarters-
. problems with the Communists persisted, and not all of the
non-Communist Resistance was Gaullist--the Resistance remain
ed tied to his committee after the spring of 1943. 25
Although able to attain substantial unity within it
self, the effectiveness of the Resistance in bringing France
together during the Occupation is more difficult to measure.
Opinion ranges from the comment of Duroselle that "the
occupation was not a unifying force" to Henri Michel's belief
25Robert Aron, France Reborn The Histor of the Liber
ation, trans. by Humphrey Hare New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1964), pp. 70-71; Henri Michel, Histoire de la
ri'sistance (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958),
.PP. 41-52; Werth, France, 1940-1955, pp. 151-55, 164-69;
Wright, France in Modern Times, pp. 521-23; A. W. DePorte,
De Gaulle's Forei n Policy 1944-46 (Cambridge: . Harvard
University Press, 1968 , p. 37.
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that consolidation of the Resistance "spared France from a

~ivil war in the liberation period.,,26

Duroselle sees dis

cord reflected in all the negative aspects of German occupa
tion: . the suffering, the political divisions, humiliation
in defeat, the loss of

freedom~

But it is possible to argue

that the misery in this period also led to the reestablish
ment of a sense of community that had all but dissipated by
the end of the Third Republic.

Marc Bloch wrote after the

defeat, "We find ourselves to-day in this appaling situation-
that the fate of France no longer depends upon the French.,,27
It is significant that his statement comes in the midst of a
critique on the way France handled herself when fate
the hands of the French.

~

in

There would be enough time during

the Occupation for many Frenchmen to deliberate, as Bloch did,
the meaning of French defeat and the direction France should
take once liberty was regained.
that the common suffering

Stanley Hoffmann contends

the war years brought about
,
Ita kind of rediscovery of France" by the French that were
o~

able to break through the confines of the

stalem~te

society,

not in the political structure where the Fourth Republic
returned to the system of the Third, but in the economic and
social spheres where "a greater awareness of the nationwide
26Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945," p. 326; Michel, Histoire de 1& r6sistance, p. 126.
27Bloch, Strange Defeat, p. 174.
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scope of economic problems" resulted from the programs of
. reS1S
. t ance movemen t s. 28.
the ma1n
The military value of the wartime resistance--which was
not great in affecting the outcome of the war--is less im
portant than the contribution it made toward signs of a
renewed France.

"There are powerful arguments for the easier

road of attentisme," Gordon Wright points out.

"Still, a

France totally committed to attentisme in those critical
years might have left a heritage quite different from that
derived from the resistance mystique.,,29

That French unity

was so easily restored around de Gaulle's government is one
of the probable differences brought about by consolidated
underground support.

"The recognition, sometimes implicit,

sometimes overt, of General de Gaulle as head of the govern
ment was the determining condition for the prevention of
30
~disaster during those difficult days of August 1944."
A review of American relations with France during the
war years does not reveal a pol1cy that contributed to French
consonance.

On the contrary, it suggests that the United

States either failed to understand French needs and interests
or. chose to give them little consideration.~1
28Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political
Community," pp. 39, 41.
29Yright, France in Modern Times, p. 526.
30Aron, France Reborn, p. 210.
31 For variation in points of view, see Arthur Funk,
who argues that President Roosevelt did not have designs on
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It is undoubtedly true that the defeat in 1940 caused
the United States to lose faith in France.

Harry Hopkins

said to de Gaulle in January 1945:
The cause (of the unfortunate state of Franco
American relations) • • • is above all the stupefy
ing disappointment we suffered when we saw France
collapse and surrender in the disaster of 1940.
Our traditional conception of her value and her
energy was overthrown in an instant. • . . Do not
seek elsewhere for the true source of the attitude
we have adopted toward your country.32
All the same, if one does look elsewhere there is an
~

odd incongruity to be seen in the position that President
Roosevelt took toward France.

On the one hand, it does not

appear that he had any worked-out political plans for France,
or that he was particularly concerned about what France's
position would be in the postwar world.

Reflecting on his

conversation with Roosevelt in the summer of 1944, de Gaulle
commented:
France, that his attitude toward France was not punitive
(although Funk contradicts himself in this on 'pp. 198-99)
and that there is no evidence that he. wanted to keep France
weak after the war, Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years.
1943-44 {Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959}, pp.
81, 300; Gaddis Smith, who insists that his desire to punish
France for defeat is one of the keys to understanding
Roosevelt's policy toward France, American Diplomacy During
the Second World War. 1941-1945 {New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1961}, pp. 12, 15-16; Gabriel Kolko, who says
that "In reality it was a question of whether France should
be weak or strong after the war • • • ", The Politics of War:
The World and United States Forei n Policy. 1943-1945 (New
York: Random House, 1968 , p. 64, passim, chap_ iv.
32The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation,
1944-1946, trans. by Richard Howard, III (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1960), 92.
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The American President's remarks ultimately proved
to me that, in foreign affairs, logic and sentiment
do not weigh heavily in comparison with the reali
'ties of power; that what matters is what one takes
and what one can hold on to; that ~~ regain her place,
France must count only on herself.
To the 'extent that Roosevelt did come to recognize the value
of rebuilding France, he did not want to make it an American
,

responsibility.

That job he wanted Britain to handle.

A

clear example may be seen in a statement of the President's
views, February 26, 1944:
In as much as the United States is approximately
3500 miles removed from Europe, it is not its
natural task to bear the postwar burden of re
constituting France. '34' This is properly the
task of Great Britain.
On the other hand, by his obstinate insistence on
commanding policy regarding de Gaulle and 'the Free French
forces, it would seem that Roosevelt chose a major role for
himself in directing French

des~iny

through the end of the

-'Yar and the liberation. 'He continually refused, to recognize
de Gaulle's committee and remained

inflexibl~

in this

position, despite repeated British urging that recognition
be granted, despite the unification of the National
Resistance Council under de Gaulle, which the United States
33 The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle:
1944, trans. b~ Richard Howard, II New York:
Schuster, 1959), p. 27.

Unit
1942
Simon and

34Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, I (Washington, United States
Government Printing Office, 1965), 184.
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was made aware of but never recognized and never negotiated
with as a collective body,35 and despite the fact that by
January 1944 both the State and War Departments had agreed
to the necessity of recognition. 36
After January 1944, Roosevelt's position became par
ticularly indefensible.

It was no longer in the interest of

the United States because it had become detrimental to the
war effort.

Eisenhower and Stimson had argued this in

January and Stimson again tried to convince the President
in June. 37 Neither was his policy in the interest of France.
Roosevelt's own advisors were telling him that.

"Who was

misinforming the President?'1 asks

"Not the·

military men in France.

H~rbert

Feis.

They were reporting that the average

Frenchman looked to de Gaulle 'as the natural and inevitable
leader of/the Free French. ,»38
avail.

But all arguments were to no

Roosevelt refused even de facto recognition until

July 1944 (more than a month after the OVERLORD invasion) and
de jure recognition until October.

This resistance to any

recognition had become a personal policy of the President
which he insisted on pursuing against all exhortation.
35Funk , Charles d~ Gaulle, p. 105.
36Ibid ., p. 217-19, 295; Herbert Feis, Churchill,
Roosevelt Stalin The war The Va ed and the Peace The
Sought Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967 , p. 318.
37Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Ser
vice in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 551.
38Feis , Roosevelt, Churchill, Stali~, p. 321.
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By October 1944, there can be little doubt that he stood
alone, among the leaders of the world, and among his advisors
at home and in France, in his unwillingness to grant recog
nition to the French Provisional Government under de Gaulle. 39
Whatever the reason for his attitude--and a dozen fears
and doubts about de Gaulle and about France have been cited
by various authors--it is certain that Roosevelt did not help
the cause of French unification in its most critical hour,
unless he did so in a negative way by uniting Frenchmen in
common indignation at the diplomacy emanating from Washington.
The endless American procrastination became an almost
universal French grievance in the autumn of 1944.

By Septem

ber, a growing number of Roosevelt's advisors were warning
. him of a possible revolution from the Left if he persisted
in his policy.40

In January 1945, three months after recog

nition had been given, complaints on this issue still showed
,
no s1gn

0f

. 41 and 1' t 1S no t unreasona bl e t
sub S1'do1ng,
0

0

sugges t

that one of the deepest roots of our postwar difficulties
with France can be found in Roosevelt's dubious French policy

ot

1944.

42

39Foreign Relations, 1944, III, 131-48.
40Kolko, The Politics of War, p. 93.
41Poreign Relations, 1945, IV, 661.
42That is Crane Brinton's argument in The Americans and
the French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.
18-19.
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A peaceful transition from Vichy to the new Republic
depended upon the extent to which the French would trust
"de Gaulle--after all, no other leader had the eminence or
support necessary to ensure a quick restoration of unity.
If their faith in him was unmoved by American diplomacy, it
is certain that faith in their American ally was shaken.
The French defeat in 1940 was a watershed moment in the
history of Europe; its significance went far

b~yond

France:

• • • (I)t was the fall of France. that shocked many
western Europeans into the first dim realization
that the Europe they had known had little chance of
surviving Hitler's war • • • • .(E)ven those
.
Westerners who refused to capitulate were shaken
into a new awareness. Charles de Gaulle in 1940
described the war as "~~e greatest revolution the
world has ever known. tf
. .
But even de Gaulle, who recognized the world's "greatest
revolution," was unable to accept its full meaning for
Prance.

Only gradually would leaders of the Fourth Republic

discover the new and painful realities of the postwar world:

.

that there were only two great powers and France was not one
of them,44 that the outcome of this war had brought an end to
the epoch of European world dominance.
Although the unanimity of Gaullist support broke down
soon after liberation, it foundered on domestic issues,
especially on the suspicion of ulterior motives behind the
43Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), p. 234.
44Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945," p. 340.
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strong-executive form of government that he was anxious to
install.

,

Leon Blum's comment on the feeling about de Gaulle
"

was that he "stood for democracy but did not embody it.,,45
In international diplomacy, however, his views were generally
accepted.

Two of the most distinguished commentators on

French affairs, M}1. Alfred Grosser and Raymond Aron, have
both pointed out that while de Gaulle's inclination to put
foreign affairs above everything else disappeared with his
resignation from office in 1946, his conception of France's
46
role in the world was not abandoned.
The role that de Gaulle chose for France was based on
the traditional idea of French grandeur.

From 1944 to 1946,

his primary goal was to re-establish French rank and pres
tige, to return France to the status of a great power.

How

was this to be accomplished?
I intended to assure France primacy in Western
Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that
might again threaten its safety; to co-operate with
East and West and, if need be, contract the neces
sary alliances on one side or the other without ever
accepting any kind of dependency; to transform the
French Union into a free association in order to
avoid the as yet unspecified dangers of upheaval;
to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps,
and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic,
45Quoted in Wright,France in Modern Times, p. 533.
See also Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870, p. 238.
46Alfred Grosser, La
politigue ext&rieur (Par=i~s~:~~A~.~C~0~1~i~n~,~1~9~6~1~,~p~p~.~3~3~-35;
Raymond Aron, France Steadfast
Fourth to
the Fifth Republic Cambridge: Harvard
Press,
1960), p. 148.
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and strategic bloc, to establish this organization
as one of the three world povers and, should it
become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet
and Anglo-American camps.47
That his policy of greatness might no longer be a role
commensurate with France's means was not one of de Gaulle's
consideratioris.

His understanding of the French and

European situation after the war was limited by his pre
occupation with reviving the traditional stalldards of French
grandeur.

Wanting to avoid a return to the old political

France of the thirties, "so malleable and so convenient for
its allies,,,48 he did not turn to a program of adaptation,
but to one rather which returned France to an even earlier
era "of French policy in the great epochs before 1914 and in
1919.

...

This was Foch's plan, taken up by Clemenceau in

1919, with improvements.,,49

De Gaulle-s view of the world

in this first phase was based upon "past realities and
present expectations," rather than upon "present realities
and future expectations. u50 Thus, the foremost threat to
security was still understood in terms of renewed German
aggression; the possibility'of France once again establish
ing herself as a great power did not seem pretentious,
47The Wa~ Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, III, 204-05.

48~., p. 205.
49Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945,1t p. 335.
50Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle. and Europe: The
Polic of the Fourth and Fifth Re ublics toward the Continent
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968 , p. xii.
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despite her severely deterioriated condition; and, as for the
colonial empire, de Gaulle remained impervious to the midcentury movement towards decolonization.
At home, the new spirit of renovation that had devel
oped out of Vichy and the Resistance, placing economic and
social reform above political aspirations, was foreign to
de Gaulle.

Yet it was here that the new sense of community

was located.

Here also could be found the quest for power,
rank and prestige 51 _-goals held in common with de Gaulle's-

but he did not recognize its significance or its value.
Whereas the new mentality looked

t~

expansion through a state

directed economy and an integrated European economy, de Gaulle
could visualize the revival of grandeur only in terms of
French ~olitical leadership.52

He was not interested in

economic matters, and his least imaginative decisions were
made in this area. 53 Throughout most of the Fourth Republic,
political leaders followed de Gaulle's example of focusing
almost entirely on political concerns.

Remarkable economic

recovery was achieved between 1946 and 1958, but much of it
51Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political
Community," p. 53.
52 Ibig,., pp. 53-54, 56,. ·75; Duroselle, "Changes in
French Foreign Policy Since 1945," pp. 337, 344; Thomson,
Democracy in France Since 1870, pp. 233-35.
53DePorte, De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, p. 283; Wright,
France in Modern Times, p. 532.
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happened "regardless of the regime, or even in spite of
it. n54 Only in the last years of the Republic, Alfred
Grosser has said, did economic modernization "burst the tra- .
ditional modes of thought and action," and shift inspiration
for political thought from tradition to acceptance of "the
constant transformation of the world in general and France
in particular."55
On the question of France's role in the postwar world,
it can be seen, then, that while there was disagreement be
tween Frenchmen as to the means--political or economic
primacy--the end coincided:

France had to regain her status.

This was de Gaulle's central concern in 1945, and under the
new Republic it became a national aspiration.
The primary collision of interests over the role that
France would play came not from within France but from the
world outside, and in particular from the United States.
Anti-American sentiment ran the full length of the Fourth
Republic and it revolved around France's repeated frustration
in attempting to effect her goal.

It is difficult to dispute

the outcome of the political" contest when one considers that,
during the course of the regime, "the entire Gaullist policy
of 1944-1946 failed • • • "56

To Duroselle, this fact

54Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870, p. 255.
55Quoted by Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign
~olicy Since 1945," p. 344.
56Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1"945," p. 337.

26
indicates that the French policy of "return to normalcy" was
unrealistic in a world so radically changed. 57

To "many

leaders of the Fourth Republic, however, it rio doubt indi
cated a new adversary.
Understanding the development of Franco-American
relations after the war demands an aware"ness of the psycho
logical climate of the "two countries.

Humiliation is a

word frequently used to describe the French reaction to the
war experience and the frame of mind that characterized the
period of 1944-1958.

Duroselle emphasises the humiliation

suffered first in defeat and later endured by France's
"slight share in the common victory"; Crane Brinton points
to humiliation as the pervasive response to Roosevelt's
policy of non-recognition; Hoffmann describes the renewed
French drive to regain her

internation~l

prestige and power

as a "battle against humiliation"; Grosser claims that the

Fourth Republic made a "nationalism of humiliation. II58

At

a conference sponsored by the World Peace Foundation in

1956, a group of French delegates reported:
The future of Franco-American relations depends in
large measure on the disappearance of the inferiority
complex :trom which the French have suffered during
57 Ibid ., pp. 335-37.

58 Ibid ., pp. 318-19, 325, 328, 330-32; Brinton, The
Americans and the French, passim, chap. iv; Hoffmann,
"Paradoxes of the French Political Community," p. 75; Alfred
'Grosser, "Commodit6s de l'Anti-Americanisme,1I Le Monde,
November 25, 1958, quoted in Serfaty, France, De Gaulle. and
Europe, p. 121.
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the past fifteen years. • •• (T)he French all too
often feel themselves to be somehow diminished, and
they often acquire in consequence the5~entality of
an isolated and misunderstood person.
The essential difference in French and American atti
tudes in this period was "the dissatisfaction of the French
and the satisfaction of the Americans when they think of the
fate of their respective countries. n60 . Consciousness of
failure was as real to the French as was American conscious
61
ness of success.
The two were often directly related.
From the first years after the war to the rejection
of the Economic Defense Community Treaty (EDC) in August
195~,

some of the most divisive isiues of the western alli

ance were raised by divergencies in policy regarding Germany.
The western powers had hoped, before 1947, to avoid the
division of Germany, but increasing concern that Germany
might move toward the Communist camp led them to encourage
economic and political reconstruction in the western zones.
American decision makers also warmed to the idea of German
integration into the West, and policy aimed in this

direc~

tion was begun when the Marshall Plan connected economic aid
with European unity.
59guoted by Raymond Aron in Raymond Aron and August
Beckscher, Diversit of Worlds: France and the United States
Look at Their Common Problems New York: Reynal & Company,
1957), p. 14.
60

Raymond Aron, Diversity of Worlds, p. 11.

61 Ibid ., p. 13.
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De Gaulle's objectives of dismemberment and strict
control of Germany characterized the unambiguous French
policy until 1947.

This policy was brought to an end simply'

by allied refusal to accept it, and, from 1947 to 1950,
France shifted with some reluctance to the western view of
cooperation.

Most of her efforts now went towards dragging

out the process of German rebuilding.
position again shifted

whe~

But in 1950, her

she proposed the European Coal

and Steel Community, for the first time initiating a move
ment toward European integration that would satisfy American
interests and her own.
From the beginning of postwar policy there had been
a small but active group of Frenchmen, stemming mainly from
the Resistance, who favored a policy of cooperation with
Germany, and after 1947 the idea of a European economic
62 . .
.
community gained in popularity.
German rearmament was
quite another question however.
signi~ied

If to Americans it merely

the next logical step in the build up of Germany,

it required for Frenchmen na complete and sudden reversal
63
of their German policy.n
Robert Schuman, the French
62This acceptance should not be exaggerated. Duroselle
writes that "as late as 1953 and 1954 during the EDC debates,
the fear of German will to dominate and the fear of being
submerged by Germany's superior economic power were still
very much alive," "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945," p. 348.
63Alfred Grosser, France Defeats EDG, ed. by Daniel
Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1957), p. 57.
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, had declared on July 25, 1949:
nGer~any does not have a peace treaty.

She has no army and

should not have any. She has no armaments and will not have
64
any."
But in September 1950, at the American request for

,.

,.

German rearmament, Rene Pleven, Schuman and Moch were forced
to advance some proposal for Germany's participation in the
defense of Europe.

By structuring the issue of remilitari

zation in the framework of the European idea, a method that
had worked

successfu~ly

with the Schuman Plan, it was hoped

that hostile members of the French government and Parliament
would be appeased, and that, at the same time, a positive
alternative might be given to the American suggestion of
German rearmament through NATO.
There followed a great debate which preoccupied west
ern diplomacy for the next three years.

It was a debate

carried on "in the true French style, passionate, theoreti
cal, and cOD.fused. ,,65

Confusion came primarily from the

fact that the
EDC combined two qui~e different ideas, only acci
dentally related: that of the rearmament of the
Federal Republic and that of a supranational
66
authority in the six-nation European community.
France's principal interest was in European unity while the
64guoted in ~., p. 56.
65Raymond Aron, France, Steadfast and Changing, p. 151.
66Raymond Aron, Diversity of Worlds, p. 36.
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United States wanted to see Germany rearmed.

But even

within France, these two distinct ideas created multiple
divisions.
Not only did the EDC's intended purpose become muddled,
but its alternative was lost sight of as well.

A substan

tial number of deputies in the National Assembly errored in
defining the choice

availa~l~

to them, and voted as if the

question was one of German rearmament or no German rearma
ment when French freedon really amounted to c'hoosing between
a French-sponsored program and the American proposal of
remilitarization through NATO.

Much of this confusion was

without doubt the fault of American policymakers who, by
1954, fully supported the EDC and tried to apply pressure to
obtain its ratification at a time when they should have
practiced restraint.

Raymond Aron states that, as to the

inappropriateness of American tactics, "there was no lack
warning by Frenchmen completely devoted to the Atlantic
Alliance. n67 The French mood was one of "a generally
~f

negative nationalism which, to assert its independence,
rejected all projects proposed by others.,,68

In this

atmosphere, Mr. Dulles' clumsy declaration that an "agoniz
ing reappraisal" would be connected with the defeat of the
EDC only increased the desire of many Frenchmen to see it
defeated.

But their miscalculation soon became evident when,

67Ibid ., pp. 38-39.
68Andr : Philip, France Defeats EDe, p. 26.
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four months later, these same men went through the humili
ating experience of confirming the earlier American pro
posal.
The lesson of German rearmament for

Franco~American

relations was not learned very well by either country
although it was repeated many times during the years of the
. Fourth Republic, over the Atlantic Alliance, the Suez affair
and the decolonization of the French empire.
On the American side, it revealed an insensitivity to
the French situation.
• • • France was the only nation in which the great
international problems of the period--the cold war,
decolonization--became the dominant demestic issueg,
the main sources of party conflicts and divisions.
This intermingling of France's foreign and domestic problems
was not sufficiently understood by the United States, despite
the evidence of the EDC debate. 70 Had Washington given more
attention to French developments and adopted a more subtle
policy on the EDC, its own interest--which was to see the
EDC ratified--might have been realized, and certainly much
of the ensuing anti-Americanism could have been averted.

69Hoffm~nn, "Paradoxes
of the French I Political
.

Community," p. 74. See also Charles Moraze, The French and
the Republic, trans. by J.-J. Demorest (Ithaca, New York;
Cornell University Press, 1958).
70
.
Edgar Furniss, France Troubled All: De Gaulle's
Heritage and Prospects New York: Published for the Council
9n Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 300.
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Neither was the anti-American sentiment, attached to
the rejection of the EDC, a special case.

Yhat gave occasion

to anti-Americanism under the Fourth Republic?

"From one

end to "the other," Alfred Grosser has commented,
from 1947-49 until 1958, the element of anti
Americanism, springing from a feeling of dependence,
seems undeniable to me. This anti-Americanism grew
stronger with the impression of greater dependence
on "the United States. 71
This "feeling of dependence" was rife by the end of the EDC
debate, and much of it had been brought on unnecessarily by
heavy-handed American diplomacy.

Throughout Franco-American

relations in the postwar period, a greater perception of
French problems, a more tactful approach on the part of the
United States when following its interests, would no doubt
have avoided numerous strains placed on the Atlantic
Alliance.
For France, the lesson of German rearmament was that
her freedom to pursue
weakness.

traditio~a1

goals was limited by her

This lesson was reaffirmed during the Suez crisis:

Britain and France, the third and fourth world powers, were
abruptly stopped and their interests overridden when they
contradicted Soviet and American aims. 72 And it was repeated
throughout the long process of deco10nization.

But the

71A1fred Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under
De Gaulle, trans. by Lois Ames Pattison, with a Foreword b~
Stanley Hoffmann (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967),
p. 7.
72Durose11e, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since
1945," pp. 340-41.
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everpresent French desire for independence was not to be so
quickly pressed into submission.

In fact,

h~miliation

and

insecurity decreased after 1954 as French economy recovered.
French businessmen learned that they were not inherently
inferior in a competitive market, and economic ties with
Germany continued to strengthen as the advantages of collab
oration became evident.

To the distress of American policy

makers, the drive toward independence became even more
exacerbated after de Gaulle's return in 1958 than it had
been under the Fourth Republic.

CHAPTER III
THE GOOD OFFICES MISSION OF 1958
By 1958, France's central concern was no longer
Germany--it was Algeria.

In the case of Germany the United

States had tried to coerce France into submitting to American
interests, against even the advice of American sympathizers
in France, thereby creating a good deal of hard feeling for
no reason.

In the case of French colonialism, and the

Algerian war in particular, the United States played a
different

kin~

interests.

of role.

Here it pretended that it had no

Here it went out of its way not to interfere

with French policy.

But in the end the result was the same.

The culmination of this policy--the seemingly innocuous
(even impotent) good offices mission in the early part of
1958--was to create a new and virulent wave of anti
Americanism.

A description and analysis of that mission

will be the concern of this chapter while the next chapter
will discuss Franco-American discord and the postwar foreign
policies of France and the United States, both more generally
and in greater depth, in an attempt to discover how it is
that America could not seem to do right.
The war in Indochina lasted from December 1946 until
July 1954, a span of nearly eight years.

It ended with

35
French withdrawal.

Soon afterwards,in November 1954, the

Algerian war began, led by what later became the National
Liberation Front, and this war outlived the Fourth Republic.
ttHistorica~ly,"

writes Raymond Aron, "the twelve years of the

Fourth Republic seem to have been dominated by these two
conflicts, which may be called colonial but whose magnitude
made them national." 1
Algeria, even more than Indochina, inspired passionate
reactions in France.

However fictitious might the thinking

have been which insisted "Algeria is France," this was the
view taught in French schools and, even in 1958, an "over
whelming majority" of Frenchmen thought of Algeria as an
integral part of France. 2

The one million French citizens

living in Algeria reinforced this idea and made arguments
for Algerian independence more difficult.

By the mid

fifties, Algeria had also taken on symbolic value.

The

regime which made a "nationalism of humiliation ll saw, in
Algeria, the last stronghold of French empire.

Many politi

cians in France, particularly those on the Right, convinced
themselves that the loss of Algeria would mean irreparable
damage to France

economi~ally

and politically.

Limited to

lRaymond Aron, France, Steadfast and Changing, p. 78.
2Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France: From Colonialism
to Cooperation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 18;
G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs: 1956-1958,
issued under the auspices of the Koyal Institute of Inter
national Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1962),
p. 280.
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her hexagon, France would be forever reduced to insignifi
cance.

For the French army, whose pride had suffered most

from the constant backsliding in Indochina, at Suez, Moracco
and Tunisia, Algeria was also seen as the last line of
resistance.

Would military leaders be willing to challenge

the Republic, if need be, to guarantee their position in
Algeria?

By 1958, military support in the political decisions

of the Republic was no longer certain.
including the head of government,

,

.

Fel~x

French leaders-
Gaillard--were uncom

fortablyaware of the army's intransigence.)
Beyond the divisions created in the search for an
Algerian solution, on one point all Frenchmen agreed:
Algeria was an internal French problem; a settlement formula,
if one was to be forthcoming, demanded the absence of outside
interference.

This insistence on a French solution became,

it would seem, a jealously guarded point of national honor.
It became as well an increasingly difficult position to
maintain.

How long could a. confrontation with the United

States be avoided while France jeopardized NATO security by
diverting most of her divisions to Algeria, or challenged
the future of a European economic community with her war'
time economic measures, or continued what could only be
interpreted in 'Washington as colonialism at a time when the
United States was vying for the friendship of newly
)Alexander 'Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution (London:
Robert Hale Limited, 1960), p. 21.
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independent nations?
1957 as no solution
self-generated.

Pressure on France grew throughout
appeare~.

Most of the pressure was

Washington, for the most part, went out of

its way to avoid straining the NATO alliance.

But France

understood American interests, and watched with growing
suspicion for any sign that their rights in Algeria might
be challenged.

And if some sign appeared--e.g. the ship

ment of arms to Tunisia in November 1957--French politicians
virtually overwhelmed themselves with hand-wringing and
· d'19na t'10n. 4
outburs t s 0f 1n
Hostilities grew, the army's·towards the Republic
which, it suspected, would soon "sellout" in Algeria as it
always had before,the Left's towards the Right for not
giving up in Algeria, the

~ight's

towards the Left for

endangering chances of an Algerian "victory" by its unpatri
otic attitude, and everyone's in France towards any outsider
who might appear anxious to precipitate an end to the war.
The bombardment of the small Tunisian border village,
Sakiet Sidi Youssef, by French forces in Algeria "once again
turned the Algerian war into a question of discord within
the North Atlantic alliance,"5 and finally gave some sub
stance to the long-nurtured fears of American involvement in
4"French Pride and Prejudice," The Economist (London),
November 23, 1957, pp. 690, 692.
5Barraclough, Survey of International -Affairs:
1958, p. 509.
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North Africa and "internationalizati6n" of the Algerian
conflict.

The good offices mission, set up to conciliate

the Franco-Tunisian rift, brought the United States and
Great Britain into the North African problem to
degree.

a

limited

Defining that limit became one of the key issues

in France's reaction to the mission.
Until now, the discussion of France and the United
States has been general, reviewing in particular events
and attitudes that shaped France's view of the world from
1944 to 1958.

In this chapter, a more specific look at

French-American relations will be taken through a consid
eration of the AnglO-American good offices mission to }'rarice
and Tunisia in 1958.

This particular mission concluded

major diplomatic intercourse between the two countries
under the Fourth Uepublic, and once again indicates some
of the broader difficulties that persisted throughout the
period.
On 'the morning of February 8, 1958, twenty-five French
-military planes strafed and bombed Sakiet Sidi Youssef in
successive waves of attack for one hour and twenty minutes.
It was a market day and many people had gathered in the vil
lage.

According to the official Tunisian count, seventy

nine persons were killed, among them eleven women and twenty
children;

130 persons were wounded.

Most of the village

was destroyed, including homes, the school, and several

.
,
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International Red Cross trucks that had been scheduled to
deliver relief supplies.
For France and Tunisia, the event marked the culmina
tion of more than a year of uneasy relations.

France was

demanding strict Tunisian and Moroccan neutrality in the
Algerian war as the price for continued friendship, but
Tunisia continued to support the insurgents, to

~arbor

rebels

on her own territory and to provide them with supplies.
moral and material aid kept her
constant strain.

positi~n

This

with France under

Relations had already reached a boiling

point on January 11 when a French detachment was ambushed
by rebel forces in Algeria near Sakiet and prisoners were
reported to have been taken back into Tunisia by their
6 When the Tunisian President, Habib Bourguiba,
captors.,
disputed this claim, refusing first to accept a French note
of protest and then to receive special representatives sent
by Gaillard, Ambassador Georges Gorse was recalled from
Tunis and negotiations for much-needed French economic aid
were droppcd.
Tunisia depended on France economically, but Tunisian
sympathies were decidedly with the Algerian rebels.

This

was Bourguiba's dilemma; it restricted his flexibility in
dealing with France.

He could not compromise his support

of the F. L. N. without damaging, perhaps irremediably, his
6The New York Times, February 9, 1958, p. 3.
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own popularity as the Tunisian leader.

Bourguiba was hoping,

nevertheless, to reopen discussions with France when, two
days before the Sakiet incident, he suggested that Ambassador
. 7
Gorse re t urn t 0 Tun1S.
The bom,bing of Sakiet, for the first time in three
years of fighting, focused worldwide attention on the trou
bles in North Africa, and sympathy was not on the side of
France.

The brutality of the attack shocked governmental

leaders around the world while, in Paris, officials were
stunned by the unrestrained and almost universal condemnation
8
of the raid.
Le Monde predicted the worst kind of result
from the bombardment for France:

that internationalization
of the Algerian conflict was now certain. 9
Habib Bourguiba saw the same possibility and bent his
efforts toward turning Le Monde's prediction into reality.
Within a week of the incident, he had submitted a formal
request for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council,
charging France with aggressive action at Sakiet.

France

filed a counter-complaint on February 14 in which Tunisia
was accused of permitting the launching of rebel operations
from her territory.10

Then, on the evening of February 16,

7New York Times, February 8, 1958, p. 2.
8

~ew

York Times, February 11, 1958, p. 2.

9Le Monde, February 11, 1958, p. 1.
10United Nations, Security Council, Thirteenth Year,
Supplement for January, February and March, 1958,'Letter

I
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Bourguiba instructed his Ambassador to the United Nations,
Mongi Slim, by telephone to Frepare a new complaint to the
effect that the Algerian war was threatening North African
peace, thus widening his earlier complaint to include
. 11
Al ger1.a.
In France, N. Gaillard was caught in an emba.rrassing
and difficult position.
been given in Paris.

The order to bomb Sakiet had not

"Who commands in Algeria?" M. Pierre

Cot asked in the National Assembly on February 11.

"Civil

authorities or military authorities? Then who has supreme
.
12
Command?"
When Foreign Affairs Minister Christ.ian Pineau
admitted several days later that neither he nor Gaillard nor
Robert Lacoste, the Minister for Algeria, had been informed
in advance of the plan to attack Sakiet, the government
again came under attack.

To former Premier Robert Schuman,

the situation disclosed a shocking lack of government con
. Al ger1.a.
. 13
t ro I over the arme d f orces 1.n

What was Gaillard to do?

The Left wing of his major

ity, the Radicals, Socialists and Catholic Popular Repub
licans, were greatly disturbed over Sakiet and demanded some

.

.

dated 13 February 1958 from the Representative of Tunisia to
the President of the Security Council, S/3952, and Letter
dated 14 Februar 19 8 from the Re resentative of France to
the President of the
3954, pp. 13-16.
l1New York Times, February 17,1958, p. 1.
~
12Journal Officiel, D~bats Parlementaires, Assemblee
Nationale, February 11, 1958, p. 663.

13New York Times, February 15, 1958, p. 3.
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form of appeasement.

But the Right wing, Independents and

Gaullists, stood in firm defense of the action.

As Robert

Doty described the dilemma,
• • • if M. Gaillard should choose to 'cover' sub
ordinates responsible for the order, he would be in
trouble with the Center and Left. If, on the other
hand, he should decide to discipline those who
14
launched the raid, the Right would react strongly.
After presenting a fairly strong case against Bourguiba's
belligerence, referring notably to his unwillingness to
cooperate in the

~anuary

incident near Sakiet, Gaillard

"covered tl the bombing without reservation and got a vote of
confidence from the National Assembly.15

"Afterwards it was

whispered that, much as Gaillard hated doing it, he had no
-choice:

had he disavowed the Army the effect in Algeria

might have been 'incalculable' •

..

Even if he had a

choice, Gaillard no doubt hoped, by his defense of the Army,
to allay suspicions that the Fourth Republic was falling
into chaos.
The United States also found itself with strong inter
ests in the Sakiet affair.

Almost immediately, Secretary of

State Dulles met with Herv~ Alphand, the French Ambassador
in Washington, to express American concern over the bombing
14Ibid ., February 11, 1958, p. 2.
15Yotingresults: 335 to 179. Journal Officiel, D~bats
Parlementaires, Assembl&e Nationale, February 11, 1958, p.
696.
16Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 21.
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and to impress upon France the importance that the United
States attached to the incident.

Of the twenty-five aircraft

employed in the raid, seventeen were American-built.

The

incident caught the United States between its alliance with
France and the image of friendship it was trying to create
among new African and Asian nations.

"Reactions from the

Arab capitols," the New York Times stated, "showed that the
Arabs regarded United States handling of the bombing as a
test of the value of United States professions of sympathy

tor the nations that recently won iheir independence."17
United States officials

free~

expressed hope that

Tunisia could be persuaded against bringing the issue before
the Security Council.

Sensitive to American concerns, the

Tunisian President suggested an alternative on February 13
of mediation by the United States.

French leaders at first

gave no indication that they were willing to modify their
position, but by February 15, they had become receptive to
some form of third-party conciliation.

Meanwhile, anxious

to head off a Security Council debate, the United States
drafted a formal offer of its good offices in the dispute. 18
It had probably hoped to extricate itself entirely from the
dispute:
17

on February 14, officials suggested the good offices
.
New York Times, February 11, 1958, pp. 1, 4.

18Ibid ., February 14, 1958, p. 1; February 15, 1958, p.
3; February 16, 1958, p. 1; February 17, 1958, p. 3.
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of Secretary General Dag Hamwarskjold, and Robert Murphy
claims that the Government was "rather reluctant" to assume
the task. 19
The good offices mission was set up as a joint AngloAmerican undertaking, with Deputy Under Secretary of State
Robert Murphy appointed as the American representative, and
Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office representing the British.
If the mission did not get underway in an atmosphere of high
expectation, almost everyone breathed a temporary sigh of
.relief at its acceptance.

No party could take comfort at

the thought of a Security Council debate.

Neither France

nor Tunisia had built a case strong enough to guarantee the
outcome.

The Tunisian record was marred by Bourguiba's

inability or unwillingness to close the border to fellaga
infiltration.

France stood to lose most from an unfavorable

decision in that the North African problem might become
truely internationalized and taken out of French hands.

And

the United States, with interests on both sides, faced
embarrassment whatever the result.
But the escape route offered by good offices presented
an illusory solution.

True, it avoided the'direct confron

tation that would inevitably have come from a meeting in the
Security Council, but was this evasiveness altogether desir
able?

The good offices further confused an already

19New York Times, February 15, 1958,.p. 3; Robert
Murphy, Correspondence with the Author, see Appendix.
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complicated situation by its indirect method and, at the
same time, sacrificed the authority needed to resolve FrancoTunisian differences.
The incompatible positions that France and Tunisia
would have taken to the·United Nations now became bases for
defining the role of good offices.

Tunisia welcomed the

mission believing that, through it, the same goals it had
hoped to attain in the Security Council would still be
realized:
a Western commitment to an Algerian settlement; the"
settlement itself, based on Algerian autonomy; th~
evacuation of French troops fro,ln Tunisia; an escape
from the risks of extremist Moslem nationalism; and
a resumption of relations, including economic ties,
with Prance. 20
Although he had received no assurance from the United States
that pressure would be put on France to negotiate an Algerian
peace, Bourguiba interpreted a statement by Dulles, suggest
ing that the Algerian question could be removed from the
strictly juridical status of an internal French problem, as
a shift in the American position. 21
Gaillard also recognized some advantages in accepting
the AnglO-American mission.

Support for his government came

from a Parliamentary majority drawn from both the Left and
the Right.

Since his majority was divided on the Sakiet

issue, the Left demanding appeasement and the Right insisting
20Furn1ss,
.
France, Troubled Ally, p. 226.

21;N~e~w-=Y~0~r=k~T=i=m~e~s, February 19, 1958, p. 3.
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that no concessions be made, Gaillard could perhaps
satisfy the demands of the Left by allowing the good
offices mission to do its work. Subsequent attacks
by the Right could then be diverted from the Premier
himself to the United States and Britain, which were
already suspected by conservatives of wishing to
eliminate French influence from North Africa. 22
Anxious, however,'to minimize outside interference as
far as possible, France insisted on the interpretation of
"good offices" provided by international law, which limits
its function to something less than mediation. 23 "Mediation"
allows for suggestions by a third party in a dispute,
"arbitration" for a moral judgment, but "good offices"
involves no more than relaying messages between disputants
until direct communication can be re-established. 24
Tunisian and French expectations of the good offices
differed radically then; Bourguiba took the broadest possible
interpretation and France the most narrow.

American offi

cials, perhaps bewildered by these contradictory positions,
were less consistent in 'defining the mission's purpose.

A

mediating role dealing solely with the Tunisian affair, said
State Department officials.

But they also "saw significance

in the fact that, with French consent, the United States was
becoming officially involved for the first time in the
22Furniss, France, Troubled Ally, p. 227.
23 Le Monde, February 25, 1958, pp. 1, 4.
24

.
Furniss, France, Troubled Ally, p. 227.
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Algerian question."25
That Murphy was sent off to Europe without any clear
assignment reinforced the tendency of the good offices to
exacerbate confusion and distrust •.

On the road to Paris,

Murphy stopped in New York and London to discuss the situation
with Dag Hammarskjold and Harold Beeley respectively.

Arriv

ing in Paris on February 24, he claimed only to be looking
for "useful conversations."26

While this noncommittal posi

tion accurately reflected Washington's anxiety to remain
neutral, to the skeptical French opinion which met him, it
suggested something more

sinister-~that

the mission's "real"

intentions were being held carefully in reserve.

And suspi

cion increased over the next two months as Murphy traveled
between Paris, Tunis and London.
In the opening talks, Gaillard emphatically told
Murphy that Algeria went beyond the purview of his mission;
re-establishing conditions for bilateral talks between
France and Tunisia must be its single objective. 27 The good
officers agreed on this

point~

Murphy claims in his book,

Diplomat Among Warriors, that the war in Algeria "was the
very last thing in which we wanted to become involved, and
25 New York Times, February 25, 1958, p. 4.
26New York Times, February 24, 1958, p. 4.
27Yerth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 23; New York
Times, February 27, 1958, p. 4.
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we carefully avoided any implication of it in our talks. 1I28
But Bourguiba wanted to discuss the war when Murphy reached
Tunis and, after his second meeting with Murphy, he stated
that they ~ad talked about Algeria. 29 Meanwhile, the New
York Times continued to speculate about a possible Algerian
settlement.

On March 1, the same day Murphy claimed Algeria

was carefully being excluded from his talks in Tunis, the
French press reported the New York Times to have said that
"a.n American solution" was "being prepared" for the Algerian
problem. 30
In retrospect, such indirect references to Algeria per
haps seem innocuous, but adament divisions in France at

th~

time had created a mood not to be trifled with:
Not since the settlement of accounts between the
wartime resistance members and collaborators, have
observers here been so oppressed by an atmosphere
of hatred and suspicion in public life engendered
by partisanship over the issue tif Algeria.
On the Right. • •• (t)he suggestion is advanced,
even in high Government circles, that withdrawal
from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
from European unity would not be too high a price
to pay to be left alone to "keep Algeria French."
On the Left there is enough fear of renascent
domestic fascism to produce the beginning of a will
ingness to work with the-Communists, if necessary,
to bring about a peaceful settlement in Algeria and
end the supressions -of liberties here and in Algeria. 31
28Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 396.
29Verth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 23.
30Quoted in ibid., p. 24.
31New York Times, March 1, 1958, p. 4.

49

Neither side felt that things were going its way and each
grew more insistent.

Carrefour and Voici Pourguoi, the two

Right-wing papers, concentrated their attacks on the good
offices mission.

In this climate, trlurphy returned to Paris

to begin his second round of talks.
M. Gaillard was having great difficulty by March
convincing anybody of his government's authority.

In an

effort to appease his Right wing, he started a police action
against the "defeatist press. n

On March 5, the Interior

Ministry seized three Leftist periodicals, L'Express, FranceObservateur and France Nouvelle, which contained articles
protesting the Algerian war.

In Le t-londe of March 7, M.

Andr~ Ch~nebenoit reacted violenjly, objecting to circum
stances in which the

~ight

was apparently free to do what

ever it wanted while the Government reserved its assaults
tor the Left.

This tolerence only encouraged the Right's
32
Fascist and racialist tendencies.
Ch~nebenoit's warning seemed justified when, a week

later, over 1000 policemen gathered outside the National
Assembly, shouting expression that were anti-Parliamentary
and even anti-Semitic.

Supposedly an economic demonstration,

the gathering was quite obviously of a political nature, and
Ch~nebenoit again blamed the Government:

For months now, there seems to be an unwritten
rule about political demonstrations: complete
32 Le Monde, March 7, 1958, p. 1.
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indulgence towards the "super-patriots", and extreme
toughness towards "defeatists". Kight-wing meetings
are allowed. Left-wing meetings--cven the most mod
erate Left-wing meetings--are prohibited. No one
trying to overthrow the regime is treated as a Rebel
anymore; only those are treated as Rebels who sho~3
up· the weakness of the Government and the r6gime.
The greatest weakness of the Government was that, con
fronted with parliamentary division, it lacked the strength
to provide a needed Algerian solution.

Algers frightened

Gaillard, and embroilment over North Africa was pushing the
French Government towards the Right as Gaillard worked not
only to retain !tight-wing support in France but to escape,
. as well, a possible confrontation

~ith

the Army in Algeria.

But efforts to gratify the Right had their limit.
Gaillard was not willing to go so far as to foster a breach
with the United States, and he continued to work with the
good offices mission.

By March 10, Murphy had won French

approval for a plan to regroup and withdraw French forces
from Tunisia in excess of those needed to
navel base.

~perate

the Bizerta

In exchange, Tunisia would have to deny free

passage and supplies to Algerian rebels by accepting neutral
surveillance of its frontier and of four southern air bases
at Sfax, Gafsa,

Gab~s

and Kemade.

34

Murphy carried his newly-won proposals to Tunis only
to be met with stiff resistance by Tunisia's President.
33Le Monde, March 15, 1958, p. 1.
34New York Times, March 11, 1958, p. 10.
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Bourguiba demanded a negotiated settlement of the Algerian
insurrection and added that France would have to accept, in
principle, the evacuation of Bizerta.
patience

w~th

gi~en

were

'tions.

the good offices mission.

He seemed to be losing
The good officers

a week to choose between his and the French posi

Insisting that the mission take a clear stand, he

said:
It is useless for the United states and British
conciliators to come to Tunisia simply to acquaint
us with Gaillard's thinking and then return to
35
France with the ideas of the Tunisian Government.
~ut

that was precisely the nature of the good office's
. An odd occurrence followed.

rol~

•

Tunisia radically modified

its defiant position and a compromise with Murphy was reached
within several days.
preted?

How was this sudden shift to be inter

Had Bourguiba finally resigned himself to the

limited function of the good offices?

Perhaps the Tunisian

Government realized at last that the most it could expect
of the Anglo-American mission was a return to the situation
before Sakiet. 36
To the French Right, Bourguiba's sharp reversal appear
ed explicable o.nly if Murphy had made a secret agreement with
the Tunisian leader to press for an Algeria~ solution. 37 A
violent campaign against the good offices began in Paris in
35Quoted in New York Times, March 14, 1958, p. 6.
36 New York Times, March 17, 1958, p. 9.
37 New York Times, March 19, 1958, pp. 1 , 9.
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anticipation of Murphy's return.

Representing the Independ

ent (moderate Right) position, Roger Duchet declared that
"inadmissable concessions" demanded of France by Murphy
would threaten a ministerial crisis. 38
A compromise settlement was predicted in "well-informed
quarters" as l-lurphy returned to Paris on March 17. 39 In
reality, the good offices stood on the verge of collapse.
Immediately in dispute~ when Murphy revealed the plan he had
drawn up, was a proposal that France turn over to Tunisians
the four airfields in the South during the course of evacuat
ing her 22,000 troops from Tunisia.

Independents and

dissident Radicals threatened to withdraw support from the
Government if this point were accepted by Gaillard. 40
The larger issue, of course, was the Right's distrust
of American motives.

This situation did not improve after

mid-March, and Gaillard's Government sank into immoblisme.
On the one hand, Gaillard hoped to keep the good offices
alive in order to avert further internationalization of the
Algerian rebellion by bringing the Franco-Tunisian dispute
before the United Nations.

On the other hand, his shaky

coalition government rested on Right-wing support which
continued to resist the good offices mission out of conviction

38 New York Times, March 17, 1958, p. 3.
39 New York Times, March 18, 1958, p. 1.
40New York Times, March 19, 1958, p. 1.
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that its proposals favored Tunisia.

Gaillard was presented

with the unattractive alternative of an international or a
domestic crisis.

Not ready to choose immediately, he suc

cessfully stalled a Tunisian decision until the end of the
month when Parliament recessed for Easter.
Before the Easter recess, Gaillard was driven by the
Right to demand neutral control of both sides of the
Tunisian-Algerian border as an indispensable condition for
.
d lrec
.
t d'lSCUSSlons
.
. 41
reopenlng
Wl. th TunlS.

Murphy returned

to London on March 10 for a five-day stay, and then carried
the French demand to Tunis.

In a conciliatory mood,

Bourguiba agreed to a number of further concessions, but
he would not accept border surveillance.

This final position

of the Tunisian Government was taken to France, and, because
of its modifications, Murphy encouraged Gaillard to accept
it.
Having assured the Assembly that border,

~ontrol

would

be the inflexible requirement, Gaillard scheduled a Minister
ial Council for Friday, April 11, to discuss the latest
proposal.

Another sensation, however, caused him to postpone

the meeting until Saturday when he received appeals from the
United States and Britain

~rging

him to

dispute out of the Security Council.'

~eep

the Tunisian

These messages were

reinforced by a letter from Eisenhower requesting that the
41Yerth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 30; New York
Times, April 13, 1958, sec. 4, p. 2.
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good offices be given another chance and asking the French
Government not to force a choice on the United states be
tween France and Tunisia.
count on

France, in other words, could

United States and Britain for no more than
abstention in a Security Council vote. 42
~he

The Gaillard Government was back in the situation of
three weeks before, but its room for maneuver had narrowed.
Pressure from the United States was stiffer and the Independ
ent's opposition had correspondingly increased.

Gaillard's

dilemma remained the same:
• (I)f he cedes to the primarily negative in
transigence of the "moderates," (Independents) he
can no longer count on the understanding and thus
the support of our allies; if he completely takes
into account the reasoning of the allies and ex
cessivelymodifies the position of the French Gov
ernment as hitherto defined, he risks being aban
do~ed.by ~~e of the most important parties of his
maJorl.ty.
Saturday's Ministerial Council, a twelve-hour ordeal,
did nothing to resolve the fundamental

disagre~ment

between

the head of government, who had moved toward supp6rt of the
good offices' proposals, and his five Right-wing ministers.
By the end of the day, an unscheduled session of Parliament
had been called for Tuesday, April 15, to settle the dispute.
Murphy's proposals would provide a "basis of discussion"
42"A Letter From Ike," Time, April 21, 1958, p. 19;
New York Times, April 12, 1958, p. 1.
43Le Monde, April 14, 1958, pp. 1, 3.
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with the right reserved to submit the frontier control issue
to the Security Council. 44
The "moderates" believed that Gaillard was giving in
to American pressure, and that they had been compensated in
the frontier question after conceding the matter of air
fields. 45 Time magazine thanked Eisenhower for winning the
Anglo-American mission a reprieve.
mistaken.
ity.

This judgment was clearly

The letter only increased parliamentarians' hostil

True, Gaillard was probably encouraged by Eisenhower's

letter to back the mission, but, to that extent, it insured
fiis fall.
At the core of rightist irritation rested the fact
that the mission had moved beyond the proper function of
good offices, and in the direction anticipated.

On Sunday,

Jacque Soustelle, the former Governor General of Algeria
who would lead the Assembly fight against Murphy's proposals,
declared bitterly:

"As was expected, the pretended good

offices has transformed itself into a partial mediation
hostile to the vital interests of France.,,46

The Right was

furious with Gaillard for his willingness to accept the
"suicidal" recommendations which were as follows:
EVACUATION: All French troops stationed outside
the Bizerta perimeter are to be evacuated in
44Yerth, The De Gaulle }Gevolution, p. 31.
45Le Monde, April 15, 1958, p. 1.
46Quoted in New York Times, April 14, 1958, p. 4.
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accordance with a time-table to be agreed upon by
France and Tunisia.
BIZERTA: While not contesting Tunisia's sovereignty
over Bizerta, France shall negotiate with Tunisia a
new status of Bizerta before the regrouping of the
French troops now in Tunisia.
AIUFIELDS: Neutral observers shall be stationed
at the four airfields in South Tunisia--Sfax, Gafsa,
Gab~s and Remade--to see to it that these are used
only for peaceful purposes.
CONSULATES: Certain French consulates in Tunisia
which were closed in February may now be reopened.
EXPELLED FUENCH CITIZENS: The Tunisian Government
will reconsider individually the case of all the 600
French citizens "removed" from their residences in
Tunisia, a~d will decide whether it is safe for them
to return. 7
It is perhaps of little importance to discuss the essential
moderation of these proposals, or, .as Nurphy himself does,
to point out that de Gaulle's later agreement with Tunisia
was less favorable to France than his own proposals in
analyzing the anti-Americanism that dominated the Assembly
on April 15.

The hostility of the Right, as Le Monde

immediately suggested, was less the result of the good
offices than the conviction that the mission worked against
the Government. 48 The execution of the good offices and of
Gaillard's Government had been decided in advance of the
Assembly meeting.
On April 15, both came under attack.

Pierre Andrt of

the Independent party directed his fire at the Government.
France's position in the Sakiet affair had been "perfectly
47Quoted in Werth, The De Gaulle Uevolution, p. 31.
48Le Monde, April 17, 1958, pp. 1, 2.
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defensible."

" • • • (I)f you

(Gaill~rd)

had fully accepted

your great responsibility, you never would have accepted
what the good offices proposed to you. ,A9
Thro~ghout

the debate, it was suggested that Gaillard's

support of the Murphy Plan resulted from foreign pressure.
At one point when Gaillard denied this, a member of the
-Right interjected:
to us!"

"Come on, you'd better read Ike's letter

Soustelle's attack was more direct:

M. Soustelle: After the failure of the "good
offices", the only thing that would explain the
Government's present policy is Eisenhower's letter.
(Loud cheers on extreme &i ht and on numerous
Right and Center benches.
M. Gaillard: That's penny novelette stuff!
M. Soustelle: So you say you haven't yielded to
outside pressure?
M. Gaillard: I have not, and I repeat it.
M.Soustelle: The fact is that you've obeyed a
summons, and this will happen again. Where, I ask
you, is Fregah policy decided--in Paris or in
Washington?
Towards Murphy and the good offices mission, Soustelle
was equally severe:
The good offices were only justified if they dealt
with the question of Tunisian neutrality. But from
the beginning the partiality of ~W. Murphy and
Deeley toward Bourguiba's Tunisia was evident. The
good offices were rapidly transformed into mediation,
and then, it must be said, into arbitration exercised
against-us. The pr~blem of belligerence was
49Journal Officiel, D~bats Parliamentaires, Assembl'e
Nationale, April 15, 1958, pp. 2140-41.
50Quoted in Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution, p. 34.
Some passages here have been condensed. For full exchange
see Journal Officiel, D~bats Parliamentaires, Assembl'e
Nationale, April 15, 1958, pp. 2145-46.
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completely left aside. If M. Murphy had exercised
on M. Bourguiba a hundredth of the pressure he put
on the French government, M. Bourguiba would have
been oblised to renounce his belligerence against
France. ~Very good! Very good! from several
benches5~f the center, the right, and the extreme
right. j
The good offices mission, he argued, was the first step to
ward abandoning Algeria.

Could anyone doubt Algeria's

importance?
Remember the lessons of the Third Republic. It
tolerated the loss of the Rhineland, then the
Anschluss, then Munich. And this ended" with the
destruct~2n of the regime and the defeat of the
country. "
It was nqw American diplomacy that threatened the repetition
of these lessons.

Soustelle exploited the theme of anti

Americanism thoroughly and decisively before the debate had
ended and the good offices' recommendations had been rejected.
By extending good offices, the United States had hoped
to avoid straining its friendships with France and Tunisia.
This it had failed to do.

Worse still, no conclusion was

brought to the French-Tunisian conflict.

"The Americans

have sown money and gathered abuse, without securing any
progress towards a solution," The Economist reported. 53
Instead, a crisis had been precipitated in the French regime.
The coalition that defeated Gaillard--the Right and the

,

51Journal Officiel, D~bats Parliamentaires, Assemblee
Nationale, April 15, 1958, p. 2145.
52 Ibid ., p. 2147.
53"France's Misdir~cted Fury," The Economist, April 19,
1958, p. 187.
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Communists--would not work together to form a new govern
ment, and it was not certain from what quarter a new gov
ernment would appear.

"You are going to open up a crisis.

How lorig will it last?" Gaillard asked the Assembly moments
before his government was overthrown.

It lasted longer than

any cabinet crisis of the Fourth Republic.

In fact, the

regime never recovered.
c~uld

Hardly anyone

have been shocked at the failure of

the good offices mission; from the outset observers had pre
dicted a less than even chance of its success.

Americans

were suprised, however, by the tremendous hostility unleashed
towards the United States during the Assembly debate over the
good offices' proposals.

54

It should be remembered foremost, in judging the French
reaction to the good offices, that, rightly or wrongly, the
United States did not represent a neutral conciliator to the
French.

There is no single historical moment of antagonism

to which one may turn in order to locate the sQurce of French
animosity and distrust.

The war experience, i.e., American

treatment of de Gaulle, had not been forgotten by the depu
ties in Parliament.
of suspicion.

Indochina presented a more recent source
~

Andre Morice, who stood ideologically next to

Soustelle in the debate of April 15, says:
54New York Times, April 17, 1958, p. 3.

..

~

'
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The French, and I was among them, took badly the
interference of the United States in an affair
(Sakiet) considered at the time as a French affair.
Let us not forget that this came after a clumsy
United States policy in Indo-China where, instead
of helping the French, the Americag~ did their best
to com,plicate every problem • • • •
That was the Right's impression of Indochina; the United
States, by its lack of cooperation, was held partly respon
sible for French defeats there.

Closer still to the Sakiet

incident was the Suez affair, another French maneuver favored
strongly by the Right.

Had American pressure to abandon the

expedition been withheld, "not only the Nasser problem would
have been settled, but also the problem of French Algeria.,,56
These events provided a general background for shaping
the attitude of the French Right

tow~rd

the United States.

The sensitive North African issues furnished a more specific
and immediate framework.

Soustelle claims that the irritation

he felt towards the "so-called" good offices mission arose,
above all, from "the incomprehension of our allies in the
Algerian affair."57
Several occurrences

~n

1957 indicated to the French

that a definite view on Algeria was evolving in Washington.
In July, John Kennedy made a long and pointed speech before
55Andr : Morice, Correspondence with the Author, see
Appendix.
56 Ibid •
57Jacque Soustelle, Correspondence with the Author,
see Appendix.
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the Senate, highly critical of France's Algerian policy:
The war in Algeria, engaging more than.400,000
French soldiers, has stripped the continental forces
of NATO to the bone. It has dimmed Western hopes
for a European common market, and seriously compro
mised the liberalization reforms of OEEC, by causing
France to impose new import restrictions under a
wartime economy.58
He also challenged American reluctance to consider the
Algerian problem in any terms other than as an exclusively
French concern:
The war in Algeria confronts the United' States with
the most critical diplomatic impasse since the cr1S1S
in Indochina--and yet we have not only failed to
meet the problem forthrightly and effectively, we
have refused to even recognize that it is our prob
lem • • • • 59
Kennedy's speech made an impression among policymakers both
in Washington and in Paris.

The sympathy he showed for the

cause of Algerian independence was understood by many in
France to represent the opinion of American officials less
free to express themselves.
In November, M. Bourguiba appealed to the United States
for arms after his request had been ignored by the French
Defense Ministry.

When the United States and Britain respond

ed by rushing several thousand rifles and machine guns to
Tunisia, the French interpretation of Kennedy's speech seemed
to have been confirmed.

In France, the reaction was violent

58Congressional }tecord, 85th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 103,
yt. 8 (July 2, 1957), 10781.
59 Ibid ., p. 10780.
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and indignant--the press unanimously condemned the Ang10
American arms shipmcnt while representativcs of every po1it
ica1 position repeated the question, Had France become less
important than Tunisia?

France's own policy toward Tunisia,

which hoped by restraining Tunisia to favorably influence
the Algerian struggle, had been punctured publicly by the
action of her allies.

The conclusion drawn by France from

the incident was more than just a hypersensitive French
reaction, for The Economist saw the same meaning in the arms
shipment:

a warning that Washington would not put up with

Franc~'s North African policy much ~onger.60
Yet the incident was apparently not meant to be a
warning at all.

It resulted instead from a decision based

on several mistaken assumptions:

that if Bourguiba did not

get arms from the West he would turn for help to the Soviet
Union, and that the weapons would be u.sed only to protect
.
61
Tunisia against the infiltration of Algerian fel1aga!
With a curious lack of perception, the American and British
Governments had failed to anticipate the effect their move
would have on France.

Probably it was the hint of Communist

arms that had caused Washington to react without consideration
for its ally.
60"French Pride and Prejudice," The Economist,
November 23, 1957, pp. 690, 692.
61Curtis Cate, "Ambassador Murphy's 'Good Offices,'"
The New Republic, April 21, 1958, pp. 5-6.
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The Tunisian arms shipment had been a blunder, not a
warning.

Kennedy came much nearer the truth than did The

Economist when he suggested that the United States was not
at ali prepared to face up to the North African problem.
American behavior at the December NATO conference in Paris
made this clear enough.

Since all but two of France's

fourteen divisions had been diverted from Europe to Algeria,
one might have expected discussion of this disruptive phe
nomenon at a conference called for the ann6unced purpose
of recementing the shaken NATO alliance.

Instead, the United

States agreed to leave North Africa out of the deliberations. 62
The "French Algerians" saw enough evidence in Kennedy's
speech and in the shipment of arms to Tunisia to confirm
suspicions that America would soon be applying pressure for
an Algerian settlement.

It was. whispered in Paris during the

NATO conference that the imperialistic Americans were after
Algerian oil.

Contrary to this impression, the arms ship

ment and the NATO conference indicate the position Washing
ton would actually take regarding the Sakiet bombing, and
they point at the same time

~o

one of the gravest problems

of American foreign policy of the period.

The United States

was attempting to pursue a middle way between diplomacy and

62 Ibid .; Curtis Cate, "NATO and North Africa," The New
Republic, May 5, 1958, pp. 7-9. In Raymond Aron's opinion,
the United States lacked leadership; see R. C. Doty, "As
NATO Meets: What Europe Says of Us," The New York Times
Magazine, December 15, 1957, pp. 61-62.
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force.

Fundam~ntally,

it was trying to avoid policy.

above all was "the reason for the

preordaine~

This

barrenness of

Mr. Murphy's mission," Curtis Ca.te wrote in The New Republic.
He added:
When anything goes wrong in the world, the Admin
istration is tempted to believe that things can be
set right be sending out a good will ambassador
who will charm the conflicting parties back into
benevolence and concord. • • • This attitude--it
cannot be called a policy--deserves to be called
the Dale Carnegie approach to power politics • • • •
His 04urphy' s) mission has perhaps been the purest
example we have yet been offered of6~uhlic relations
as a substitute for foreign policy.
Considering the good offices mission as a public rela
tions venture, some attention must be given to the image of
the American representative, Robert Murphy.

Christian

Pineau, in deeming his appointment to have been "insensi
tive,H64 presents a rather widely accepted view that demands
some exposition.
The reputation that Murphy had earned from his wartime
activities was particularly unsuited to appease Gaullist
circles in 1958:
They attributed to him an attitude hostile to the
General's person, from the fact that he was
President Roosevelt's representative and that his
personal activity had been deemed, in 1944, favor
able to General Giraud.o,
63 Cate , "Ambassador Murphy's 'Good Offices,

ttl

p. 6.

64Christian Pineau, Correspondence with the Author,
see Appendix.
65 Ibid •
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De Gaulle himselr placed Murphy high on his long list of
adversaries and despised him to the point of hatred.

When

Murphy requested a meeting with de Gaulle, after coming to
66
Paris,·he was coldly refused.
Determining the attitude of

the Right toward his appointment required little speculation
on Murphy's part.

Immediately upon arriving in Paris in

February, he read an article by Michel Debrl, one of the
representatives of Gaullist opinion, which suggested in
effect that he return home immediately.67

As Schoenbrun

puts it:

tiThe Gaullists howle¥d with rage, and a wave of
"68
anti-Americanism swept over France.
The indiscretion of Murphy's appointment was a reflec
tion of Washington's failure to consider the importance of
rightist animosity.

" • • • One may say that between 1947

and 1957 anti-Americanism in France passed from the Left to
the Right," Alfred Grosser has written. 69 This shift was
brought about chiefly by American failure to support the
Right's two favorite programs:
"pacification."

the Suez policy and Algerian

But the United States remained oblivious to

66David Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles de
Gaulle (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 125, 231.
67Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 395-96; Murphy,
Correspondence with the Author, see Appendix.
68Schoenbrun1 The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle,
p. 231.
69Quoted in Furniss, France, Troubled AllX, p. 301.
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the emerging

hos~ility

from the Right, and continued to

interpret all anti-Americanism by the standard formula-
. Communist agitation.
The Communists did, of course, adopt their familiar
anti-Government, anti-American line during the debate of
April 15, and they voted solidly. against the Murphy-Beeley
recommendations.
the Right.

But the most vehement attacks came from

-

Moreover, since the success of Gaillard's coali

tion government depended upon the support of the Right, not
of the Communists, their vote was unimportant.

A vote of

affirmation was never expected from that quarter.

These

facts should have been blatently obvious, especially to
Murphy because of his closeness to the events.

Yet, in

several addresses given by him after returning from Europe-
on May 19 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
on July 1 at the 1958 Colgate Foreign Policy Conference in
New York--he blamed Soviet propaganda for exciting the anti
American sentiments in France. 70
In one sense, Hurphy's war credentials were well suited
for the good offices mission of 1958.
restricted
Algeria.

During the war he had

to the role of reporting conditions in
71
He shunned policymaking.
Obscurity, derived
hi~self

70Robert Murphy, "Review of Recent Anti-American
. Demonstrations," The Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII
(June 9, 1958), 952-61; Robert Murphy, "Basic Elements in
United States Foreign Policy," The Department of State
Bulletin, XXXIX (July 28, 1958), 141-46.
71 Funk, Charles de Gaulle, pp. 90-91.
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from avoidance of policy, characterized his war image.
Robert Aron has called him "that most enigmatic of diplo
matists."

"Indeed," says Aron,

he'was so enigmatic that he gave every appearance
of puzzling himself. This curious man often gave
the impression of not understanding the issues
involved; perhaps this very fact enhanced his rep
utation. He was everybody's friend. Right wing
with the Right, Left wing with the Left, he reflect
ed all the prejudices and errors of American'
diplomacy. Indeed, ~~ net only reflected them,
he exaggerated them.
Aron, referring here to the war period, might easily have
been speaking of 1958.

MurFhy again represented the Adminis

tration's approach yar excellence.
In his book, The De Gaulle Revolution, Alexander Werth
tends to equate the unpopularity of the good offices with the
unpopulari ty of Robert 14urphy, stressing the extreme distrust
that Murphy's image delineated. 73 But this is to place'too
much blame on the American Ambassador.

After all, he was, as

has just been stated, an admirable representative of Washington's position.
Many Frenchmen involved in the events of the good
offices mission concur in the opinion that, while Murphy's
appointment was imprudent, he does not deserve to carryall
the responsibility for the French reaction but might best be
seen as an additional factor of antagonism.

Although Pineau,

for example, considers Murphy's choice to have been an

12Robert Aron, France Reborn, p. 216.
13Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution, pp. 22-24, 30.
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insensitive one, the fact remains that tlany other choice
would have also brought reservations with it," for the good
offices mission itself "seemed to (the Gaullists) an attack
on French sovereignty in the form of an Anglo-American in
trusion in an affair considered a purely national matter. tt74
This impression is confirmed by Andrl Morice, L&on Delbecque,
Pierre Pflimlin and Andrt Philip, as well as by Alfr~d
Grosser and Raymond aron. 75

Exactly how decisive a role he

played in the failure of the good offices mission--and thus
the fall of the Gaillard Government and even the downfall of
the Fourth Republic--is a matter more open to disagreement.
Opinion varies from Grosser's conclusion that his role

wa~

indeed decisive to Aron's judgement that it was, in the end,
of little importance. 76 Perhaps all these men could Agree
with Schoenbrun's dictum:
In the greater scheme of things Murphy was only a
small pebble among the many boulders on the rocky
road of French-American relations. But it was the
kind of small pebble which gets inside a man's shoe
and causes a pain and a stumbling out of all pro
portion to its size and importance. 11
74Pineau, Correspondence with the Author, see Appendix.
75Andrt.Morice, L'on Delbecque, Pierre Pflimlin, Andr:
Philip, Alfred Grosser, Raymond Aron, Correspondence with the
Author, see Appendix.
16Grosser and Raymond Aron, Correspondence with the
Author, see Appendix.
71Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle,
p. 125.
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. It may seem suprising that some of those, whose
attacks on Murphy were the most clamorous in 1958, go the
farthest today in releasing him from censure.

Who would

expect.to hear Soustelle say that "The personage of Mr.
Murphy was not concerned" in

"the attitude of a great many

members of Parliament and of myself towards the so-called
'good offices' mission • • • tI?18

And Andr: Norice, who

sharedSoustelle's opinions in 1958 now writes:
If ~r. Nurphy's good offices mission became a
stalemate, this is not due, according to my think
ing, to Mr. Murphy's personality, a personality
which we have no need to discuss. If anyone other
than Mr. Murphy had been placed at the head of this
delegation, he would have done 'no better.19
These statements indicate a rather remarkably congenial atti
tude toward Murphy when compared with the views being ex
pressed by the same men in April, 1958, and they would appear
to indicate once again that the denouncements of Murphy can
not be taken too literally.

The issues of animosity were

larger than one man's personality.
No American representative would have been very well
received.

Perhaps Ministers and members of Parliament remem

bered Murphy's past, but most Frenchmen had forgotten it.
Yet, public opinion was no less skeptical of the good offices
mission than the French Government.

"It is thus not Mr.

78Soustelle, Correspondence with the Author, see
Appendix.
19Morice, Corr·espondence with the Author, see Appendix.
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Murphy's presence at the head of the good offices mission,
which explains the mistrust of a part of public opinion and
the hostility of another part towards this mission_ H80

The

source of hostility was to be found in the French interpre
tation of the mission "as an underhanded attempt (by the
United States) to internationalize the Algerian conflict. u8l
The concern here is not with the truth or falseness of
the French view, but with an American style and an American
representative that encouraged distrust needlessly be their
approach to diplomacy.

To prove that French suspicions were

groundless (as they probably were) does not vindicate the
United States.

The Administration, anxious to playa dual

role in the Franco-Tunisian conflict of holding the NATO
alliance together on the one hand and sympathizing with Arab
nationalism on the other, tried to walk on neutral ground
where there was none.

While Kennedy's speech was at least

useful to the French in exposing an American position that
could be appraised openly, the Administration's noncommittal
attitude only complicated an already equivocal situation.
Probably no other diplomatic approach by the United
States was better suited to aggravate the suspicions and
xenophobia already present in France.
accomplished nothing.

At the same time, it

In positive results, the good offices

80Delbecque, Correspondence with the Author, see
Appendix.
81 Ibid •
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mission was barren, maturing a crisis without precipitating
solutions..

The Franco-Tunisian dispute continued.

in Algerii was no nearer a solution.

The war

No stand had finally

been taken by the American Government towards Algeria, a
problem vital to its own

interests~-indeed,

the whole purpose

of the good offices mission had been to avoid that kind of
decision.

American "meddling" had only confused and infuri

ated Frenchmen unnecessarily.

At every level of consider

ation, the good offices mission of 1958 can be. understood as
an indication of Washington's unpreparedness to define a
policy towards North Africa or to face up to the true com
plexity of the political situation in France.

CHAPTER IV
DE GAULLE RETURNS
After the establishment of the Fifth Republic, there
was a tendency among Americans to lose sight of the fact
that Franco-American discord had predated the new regime
and to blame de Gaulle entirely for foreign. policy diver
gences.

"Because they tended to judge other nations in

terms of individual personalities rather than their historic
interests," Walter LaFeber comments, "Americans tended to
believe that Franco-American agreement would be fully
restored whenever de Gaulle departed from the scene." 1
It was not exclusively an American reaction to turn
to the figure of General de Gaulle when searching for the
source of further disparity in the French and American
positions.

Duroselle wrote in 1964:

"It is beyond doubt

that the role of the General in the ~reation of this
(Franco-American) tension is of major importance, if not
totally responsible. 2
1Yalter LaFeber,America. Russia, and the Cold War,
1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967),
p. 237.
2Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for
Europe and the West," Changing East-West Relations and the
Unity of the West: Papers Presented to the European
American Colloquium, May 1 and 2, 1964, at the Washington

7)
Yet there was more than a modicum of truth (and
warning) to be found in Jean Cauls observation that
"De Gaulle does not exist.
have about themselves.")

He is just the idea the French
After years of discord, de Gaulle

did not forge domestic concensus solely on the basis of his
personal prestige and without regard for French interests-
as too many Americans imagined.
a "basic, obvious fact:

Stanley Hoffmann deems it

the personal style of the General

gives its special shape to a policy which, in its aspirations
and connotations, corresponds to French desires.,,4

Even

Duroselle did not suggest that agreement would be restored
after de Gaulle's rule had ended.

Duroselle distinguished

between de Gaulle's tactics and his overall strategy, or
long-range views.

Were it only Gaullist tactics that provid

ed the source of friction, conflict could pass with de Gaulle.
But the long~range goals which made up de Gaulle's program
and which had the support of the French also conflicted
violently with the Atlantic policy of the United States. 5
Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced
International Studies The Johns Ho kins Universit , ed. by
Arnold Wolfers Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p.

111.
)Quoted by Henri de Turenne, "Grand Subject," The New
York Times Magazine, September 12, 1965, p." 114.
4Stanley Hoffmann in the Foreword to Alfred Grosser,
French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. xi.
5Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for Europe and the
West," p. 191.
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French dissatisfaction with the Atlantic Alliance did
not begin with de Gaulle's return.

Alfred Grosser suggests

two elements which made Atlantic solidarity a "reluctant
choice" for the French under the Fourth Republic.

The first,

mentioned above, was "the element of anti-Americanism spring
ing from a feeling of dependence • • • "

The problems of

decolonization--the loss of Indochina and the Algerian war-
heightened the sense of dependence for they were accompanied
by a feeling that France was declining while the United,
States was rising.
The second element of malaise involved in the
Atlantic choice was based on the impression that
the United States would not guarantee French secu
rity when certain actions, rightly or wrongly dee~ed
essential to French security, ran counter to
American policy--such as the Suez expedition in 1956
and even the Algerian war. 6
Thus, as the feeling of dependence increased, the impression
that French interests would be protected by this dependence
decreased.
This analysis is useful in interpreting the response
of distrust and anti-Americanism to the 1958 good offices
mission.

Specific incidents; such as Eisenhower's letter,

as well as the mission in general, stimulated both elements
of malaise.

The feeling of dependence was blatantly demon

strated by Soustelle's performance in the Assembly, and
particularly with his question, "Where, I ask you, is French
6Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. 7.
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policy decided-':"in Paris or in Washington?"

Simultaneously,

the tenor of the letter and the very fact of the mission
suggested that French interests would not be guaranteed by
the United States.
It is not suprising, then, that criticism of American
diplomacy in the Franco-Tunisian dispute continually went
beyond the specific issue of the good offices mission--the
larger concern was with the Atlantic Alliance system.
Soustelle complained of American

willingnes~

When

"to sacrifice

its European allies in its ridiculous search for Arab friends,
lest they fall under Communist influence,"7

he was calling

into question the validity of Ameri.can foreign policy in
general as it related to French interests.
What were the aims of American policy?

Since the

Second World War, the United States has relentlessly pursued
two goals in its foreign policy:

the first is anti

Communism; the second is the defense of peace.

In the

second chapter, I emphasized primarily the clumsimess of
of American attempts to impress its interests on France and,
in the third chapter, the essential shallowness of American
foreign policy.

These two points are related by their inter

connection with American goals--in particular, by the
enormous American concern with

C~mmunism.

7Quoted in Alexander Verth, De Gaulle: A Political
Biography (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1967), p. 12.
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The United States, unlike its allies, made antiCommunism the guiding principle of its foreign policy.

Vhat

sort of a program could be constructed on the principle of
anti-Communism?

Duroselle claims that the United States did

not develop an ideology after the war; rather it built a
counter-ideology in reaction to Communism. 8 Whatever label
is applied, -the results of the American policy of reaction
have been several.
The firs·t can be seen in the poverty of American
foreign policy.

I have described the good offices mission

as an anti-policy effort.

As

such~

it was more representa

tive than unique, for when Washington was not confronted
with a clearcut case of Communism versus anti-Communism it
found itself in the uneasy position of not knowing what
its interests were, or if it had any special interests.
Only when reacting to or anticipating what it viewed as a
Communist advance did Washington move with self-assurance.
And the overbearing enthuasism shown by the United States
when attempting to secure itself from Communism often
offended and antagonized France by its tactlessness and
narrow vision, by the lack of concern shown for alternatives
which might have incorporated the additional interests of
of its ally.

Such was the case of the EDC debate in 1954.

8Duroselle, "De Gaullets Designs for Europe and the
West," p. 182.
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An anti-Communist counter-ideology, if nothing else,
has proven to be too narrow a base for the construction of
an entire foreign policy.

The real complexity of foreign

affairs, brought about by the separate national interests
of the United States and its allies, defies reduction to
such a restrictive framework.

In an article entitled "The

Impotence of American Power, 'I Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1963:
• • • (O)ur impotence is aggravated and rendered
irreparable by our commitment to ariti-Communism as
the overriding objective of our foreign policy.
For most of our allies, anti-Communism is at best
incidental to concrete national objectives and at
worst irrelevant to them • • • 9
What is more, anti-Communist policy insists on the primacy
of its goals at all times.
Conflicting analyses of the Communist danger underlay
much of the disparity in French and American foreign policy
aims after the mid-fifties.

The extension ad absurdum of

the United States commitment to anti-Communism can be seen
as a second adverse result of its counter-ideology.

For a

time, especially during the period of Stalin's provocations,
'Communism appeared as a menace to the national interests of
all Western powers.

The threat diminished by the mid-fifties

however, and as one might expect, national priorities in
France shifted; but not in the United States where a pro
gram of anti-Communism had become the key to maintaining
peace in the world.

The United States clung to Manichean

9Commentary, November, 1963, pp. 384~86.

18
interpretations of the cold war, like those of President
Truman or John Foster Dulles; its view of the world remained
limited to the contest of forces of good and evil as it
battled the Communist ogre. 10
In France, this view lost its vitality by 1955.

The

French public became less concerned with Communism than with
protecting French independence from the United States.

One

public opinion survey reveals that while until October 1954
approximately the same number of Frenchmen

~anted

France to

remain committed to the West as those who wanted her to be
uncommitted, by June 1955 Frenchmen chose to side with
neither the East nor the West in a ratio of three to one over
those who preferred commitment to the West.

This ratio

seldom fell below two to one during the remainder of the
Fourth Uepublic. 11
As the Soviet menace subsided, it was the American
presence, not the H.ussian, that confronted Europeans.

The

concern generated by this revelation was already evident
during the Fourth Republic, but by the sixties it had vir
tually turned into Americanophobia.

Etiemble's best-seller,

Parle-vous franglais?, owed its extraordinary success to
1°Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for Europe and the
West," p. 182.
11Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala, eds.,
Western Euro ean Pers ectives on International Affairs:
Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 220.
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the virulent anti-Americanism that it represented.

12

Anti-

Americanism was a reality of the Fourth Republic; the Fifth
Republic made it into a virtue. 'W. W. Kulski points out
in his -book on de Gaulle that French patriotism "today is
colored by anti-Americanism as for many past decades it was
colored by a strong Germanophobia. n13 The intensity of
Americanophobia was well expressed by Maurice Duverger in
an interview in 1964:
It must be said, it must'be written--the sole near
danger for Europe is American civilization. There
will be neither Stalinism nor communism in France.
All that is a scarecrow that no longer frightens
anyone but the sparrows. From.1946-48, in 1952,
there was still a communist danger, but today all
that appears past. In contrast, the pressure of
American society, the domination of the American
economy, the invasion of the American mentality-
all that is very dangerous. 14

American domination directly contradicts the central
foreign policy objective which France has sought to realize
under both the Fourth and the Fifth Republics:
t~on

of a status worthy of her historic mission.

the resump
The basic

foreign policy objectives of the United States and France
12Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p.
140; see also John Ardagh, The New French Revolution, Harper
Colophon Books (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969)
pp. 264, 458.
13V• W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign
Policy of the Fifth French Republic (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1966), p. 77.
14Georges Suffert, ttEntretien:
L'Express, March 5, 1964, pp. 39-40.

Maurice Duverger,"
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not only differed in the fifties and sixties but conflicted-

both countries chose leadership roles.

And the philosophical

bases on which their respective objectives were justified
disagreed as well.
The French desire since the war to recover its rank
has never been a goal supported by the United States.

In

the forties and fifties it seemed a romantic impossibility;
in the sixties, when it was possible, it ..ra.s denounced as
anachronistic.

The reason is clear.

With its attention

riveted to what it perceived to be the creeping danger of
Communism, the United States judged the continuance of its
presence in Europe to be mandatory for the duration of the
East-West conflict.

This presence has not, of course, been

seen by the United States as a matter of domination, but
r.ather as a matter of protection under American leadership.
But it demanded the support and, it must be said, the sub
mission of France to this leadership.

General de Gaulle,

who chose to reaffirm French independence whenever possible
instead of looking to American guidance, was frequently the
subject of vehement American criticism, his actions deemed
tantamount to treason.

Now, in Grosser's words,

the United States is in a position at least as anach
ronistic as the anachronism France is allegedly
guilty of. In constantly reproaching General de
Gaulle for his refusal to submit to a majority vote,
American opinion has displayed an altogether dis
armingly clear conscience, in view of the American
inability even to conceive of the fact that true
Atlantic equality would require American submission
to majority decisions. The incomprehension here is
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total, for American leaders and the American public
find it inconceivable that the United States should
los: itf5full sovereignty in matters of decision
mak1ng.
For de Gaulle, France's
unrealistic nor undesirable.

~entral

objective was neither

He had been the first to

formulate that objective while he headed French government
in 1944-46, and since that time support of his view had
grown.

By 1958, he

was not untypical, but on the contrary character
istic, of Frenchmen and of many other Europeans
in wishing to diminish political and strategic
dependence on the United States a§ soon as economic
dependence was no longer a fact. 16
And circumstance was on his side, for economic dependence
had in fact greatly decreased by 1958.

tfDe Gaulle not only

desired the revival of France: he rightly saw that it was
happening. tl17 Contrary to what has often been assumed
abroad, French economic recovery, "Though overshadowed by
the crises of colonial wars and by weak, shifting
Governments," was solidly underway by 1958. 18 To the credit
of the Monnet Plan, not de Gaulle, a'new mood of innovation
and belief in progress also pervaded French industry,
15Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle,
p. 135.
16peter Calvocoressi, International Politics Since
1945 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 135.
'17
.~
Ibid., p. 133.
18Ardagh, The New French Revolution, pp. 6-7.
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playing a vital role in the French revival.

"'When de Gaulle

returned to power in 1958, the recovery of industry was well
advanced and output was rising rapidly.1I 1 9
France had rebuilt her ruins and she had regained much
of her self-esteem by 1958.

This change offered a new free

dom of perspective in reviewing the Atlantic Alliance.

And,

after the Algerian war was concluded in 1962, de Gaulle's
freedom to act was also grea.tly increased. 20 Greater
independence was no longer an impossible dream.

Why did it

gain popular support? . As has already been mentioned above,
the later events'of the Fourth Repuplic--the Suez affair
and the Algerian war--convinced a growing number of French
men that reliance on the United States did not necessarily
guarantee the success of policies believed to be vital to
French security.
And then, from a strategic point of view, dependence
was no longer an entirely satisfactory solution.

In the

case of a nuclear war, an overwhelming majority of French
men preferred by 1958 to remain neutral. 21 Not without
reason.

Raymond Aron, in 1963, explained the French concern:

To begin with, European cities are open to strikes
by medium range missles, of which the Russians have
•

19~., pp. 6, 15.
20Duroselle, "De Gaulle's Designs for Europe and the
West," p. 173.
21Merritt and Puchala, eds., Western European Perspec
tives on International Affairs, p. 224.
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a large number, while cities in t'he United States
can be hit only by ICBMs, still relatively rare
according to the United States experts. Further
more, raising the atomic threshold might, in lay
man's language, mean that war could be fought on
European soil and devastate that continent while
the territories of both the United States and the
Soviet 'Union were spared out of a desire A strategic
or moral, to prevent extreme escalation.~2
There was a further strategic consideration:

the American

deterrent remained almost exclusively under American com
mand, an arrangement Americans were not easily persuaded to
change.

To General de Gaulle, "Atlantic interdependence"

appeared to be "sheer :window dressing, barely veiled hypoc
risy designed to camouflage Europe's reduction to political
'23
vassalage by the United States in the guise of protection."
The French concern over her inequality in decision making
was not simply a sign of frustration or humiliation at her
less prestigious position.

The Cuban missle crisis of 1962,

in which France was in reality only kept informed of the
evolution of events, made it clear that France could become
involved in a nuclear war without her own choosing--without
even participating in the decisions that brought the war
about.
The advantages of dependence were not 'easily discerned.
American national interests

~ook

precedent over those of

22 Raymond Aron, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear
Strategy, trans. by Ernst Pawel, Anchor Books (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 76-77.
23l...-b;d.,
...
pp. 168 , 169 •
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France.

And, when considering the East-West conflict, the

"protection" offered by the Atlantic Alliance could be seen
as either irrelevant or dangerous:

if the Communist threat

had passed, protection was no longer needed; if it had not,
the Alliance was more apt to make a target of France than
provide a shield--and that with France having little voice
in the matter.

Even had a substantial movement in France not

existed ever since the war to re-establish French independ
ence and leadership, there would have been serious reasons
by the early sixties for reconsidering France's dependent
role vis-~-vis t"he United states.
The point is that de Gaulle was not needed in order
to make these problems evident to the French.

Even less

was he voicing only personal concerns when he spoke out on
these issues.

kather, de Gaulle's long-range goals were

anticipated by the French; his own conception of a nation's
rights and his analysis of the world situation provided a
philosophical basis for what the French already believed.
De Gaulle's fundamental foreign policy goal after
taking office in 1958 was "to achieve equality within the
Alliance, while awaiting the day when the world will no
longer be divided into two blocs.,,24
Considering first his insistence on French equality,
in de Gaulle's concept, France as a great nation must have
24Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle,
pp.118-19.
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the freedom to follow its own interests.

This view basically

disagreed with the idea of American leadership in a "Grand
Design" policy.

Henry Kissinger, one American observer who

has recognized the divergence in the two positions, comments:
Consequently, the dispute between France and the
United states centers, in part, around the philo
sophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washing
to~ urges a structure which makes separate action
physically impossible by assigning each partner a
portion of the over-all task. Paris insists that
a consensus is meaningful only if each partner has
a real choice. Therefore, each ally must--at
2
least theoretically--be able to act autonimously. 5
By stressing the importance of nationalism, de Gaulle was
Dot opposing the coordination of

We~tern

policies.

"Con

vinced that only those capable of assuming responsibility
can form meaningful associations, he can logically affirm
his faith in the Atlantic Alliance while insisting on the
identity of Europe and the uniqueness of France.,,26

A

political unit that means nothing to itself can have no
meaning to others.

On this basis, de Gaulle sought real

participation for France in the Atlantic Alliance.
His view again differed significantly from that of the
United States over the issue of bipolarity:
In General de Gaulle's view, it is true that the
East-West conflict exists, but it will not be eter
nal, and nothing must be done that would prevent a
25Henry A. Kissinger, The TrQubled Partnership: A
Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, Anchor Books (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 46.
26 Ibid ., p. 62.
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change on the world chessboard in case of a detente
in the East-West conflict. In the American view
• • • the East-West conflict will constitute the
major axis of world politics for a long time to
come: to worry about what will happen afterward
is in the realm of prophecy and not politics. 27
This' last quotation from Grosser suggests what is per
haps the most fundamental disagreement between the Gaullist
outlook on the international scene and the American.
Gaulle always maintained a historical perspective.

De
It is a

historical lesson that nations outlive ideolgies, that con
flicts end, and de Gaulle did not forget to apply this lesson
"to the East-West conflict.

When he spoke, for instance, of

"the Atlantic Alliance currently necessary to the defense of
the free world" in his message to Parliament on December 11,
1962, he was not prophesying but expressing an awareness of
the process of change. 28
But it is just this kind of awareness that is foreign
to the American mentality.
not think historically.

One might say that Americans do

If it is one of the great weaknesses

of the Marxian interpretation of history to bring the dia
'lectic' process to an end, it, is the even greater weakness of
the American interpretation never to acknowledge the histor
ical dialectic.

How does this relate to American foreign

27Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle,
p. 114.

28Note quoted in ibid.
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policy?

Earlier it was suggested that the two principal

goals of American foreign policy since the war have been
the defense of peace and anti-Communism.

Neither of these

goals could have taken the form they did without American
resistance to historical thinking.
Consider first the American conception of peace:
The United States has a tendency to believe that
peace and stability are "natural.1t Crises must,
therefore, be caused by personal ill-will rather
than by objective conditions. If tension persists,
it is because Communist leaders continue to be un
reasonable; it can be ~lleviated by establishing an
atmosphere of trust and good personal relations ~9
by a change of heart on the part of the Soviets.
This view applies no less to the United States attitude
toward de Gaulle than it does to East-West relations.

And it

completely ignores historical perspective; stasis is the con
stant, change an invading and evil force.

American policy

envisages a world "where all conflict has ended and nations
live under 'the rule of law. ,,,30

This might be an admirable

ideal, but Americans have yet to distinguish between the
ideal and reality.

Here, it might be added, de Gaulle's

view has been more historical.

Peace to him "is achieved

not by personal reconciliation but by the establishment of
a more s t a bl e equ1'l'b'
1 r1um. ,,31
Again, the connection between anti-historical thinking
29 ,
,
K1ss1nger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 58.

30 Ibid •
. 31~.,p.6.
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and the pre-eminent position of anti-Communism in American
for6ign policy seems s~ basic that ODe wonders whether the
latter could exist without the formera'-or at least whether it
could be taken with such seriousness.

The radical present

mindedness of the American view--the unwillingness to look
back or to look ahead--Iends to the view of international
relations

s~ggested

by Henry Kissinger in the quote above

and by Walter LaFeber at the beginning of this chapter:
crises are brought about, not by historic events such as the
clash of national interests, but by individuals bearing
personal antipathy toward the United States.

Communist

leaders proved to be the most reliable and convenient antag
onists, but the General as well was seldom above suspicion.
De Gaulle's historical perspective removed him from
one-diminsional ideological commitments.

He believed that

the bipolar structure had originated at a specific date (the
Yalta Conference) and he was equally convinced that it would
not continue forever.

Whatever misjudgements he might have

made here, he at least had the historical acuity to recog
nize that the latest major world division did not ipso facto
infer a final world ordering.

This recognition, however

obvious it might seem, was by no means trivial since he made
it the basis for evaluating the state of world affairs.

It

gave him the freedom and the incentive to plan for France's
future at a time when. most world leaders' concerns were with
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day to day events.

For American policymakers, on the other

hand, the bipolar order was more readily seen as permanent.
A central policy of anti-Communism confirmed and perpetuated'
that permanence.
All this suggests basic differences in the French and
American positions, both in national interests and in per
spective.

The primary concern of this paper has been with

Franco-American discord under the Fourth Republic, but it
does not seem irrelevant to have moved, however briefly and
generally, beyond 1958.

The central pollcies and perspec

tives on both sides indicate continuum rather than movement
in new directions, but at the same time a sharpening of
focus so that the conflicts of the fifties can be more
readily understood.

Certainly American concern with Commu

nism did not begin in the sixties; neither did French concern
over its independence versus American "leadership" begin at
the time of de Gaulle's return to power.
How does one pin down the sources of Franco-American
conflict?

Does one begin with Roosevelt's French policy of

1944, with his personal animosity for de Gaulle and his with
holding of recognition, ~s Brinton suggests~32

But that

would imply that criticism of American diplomacy should have
eased during the Fourth Hepublic when the General had dis
appeared from public view--a time in which anti-Americanism
32Brinton, The Americans and the French, pp. 78-79.
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was developing solid foundations.

Or does one look, with

LaFaber, to the disagreement over Germany's position in the
postwar world?))

As Grosser points out, however, "we (the

French) go virtually from 'no enemy, but Germany,' in 1944,
to 'no friend, but Germany,' in 1958."

Germany and Algeria,

the two countries with which France shared the most suffer
. ing, were in the sixties the two countries with which France
. talne
' d pr1vl
" 1 ege d re 1 a t'lons. )4
ma1n

Ye t tho1S t rans f orma t'l on

in Franco-German relations did not see a parallel in FrancoAmerican relations.
The search for roots is perhaps a pointless game.

If

one insists, however, on locating the source of FrancoAmerican discord, it is not likely to be found in any specific
event or series of events.

Of the EDC debate over German

rearmament, which seemed to be tearing France apart in 1954
and to threaten permanent damage to Franco-American relations,
what was remembered by 1958?

It is in the separate attitudes,

rather, out of which grew the postwar policies of France and
the United States to combat Communism--that the real roots of
discord might be discovered.
It is not just that interests conflicted but that, as
differences became more marked, the two countries were not
33LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966,
pp. 9, 48-52 •
. 34Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle,
pp. 6, 45.
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equally free to follow their own concerns.

Specifically,

France found that she was not as free as she might have
supposed of American guidance.

Being dogmatically commit

ted to its ideology {or counter-ideology} and thus working
in the realm of absolute rather than relative truths, the
United States for its part could not allow--could not
conceive of--France or any other ally having separate
interests.

Such interests could only indicate conspiracy

or misdirection.

The accusations and hostility directed at

de Gaulle, often for nothing more than his courage to speak
up for French interests, reflect the extent of American
incomprehension.
Anti-Americanism became more explicit under de Gaullets
foreign policy but it certainly did not begin there.

It is

the weakness of American thinking that would hold the person
ality of the General responsible for the disintegration of
Franco-American relations.

Disintegration was inevitable

perhaps from the moment the United States assumed that French
interests would naturally and invariably coincide with
American interests--that is to say, from the beginning.
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APPENDIX
On the following pages I have included the letters
that I quoted from or, for one reason or another, found
interesting or valuable.

I regret that two letters which

have been particularly helpful in shaping my opinion--those
of ~W. Michel Debr~ and Pierre Mend~s-France--could not be
quoted or included her,eby request of their authors.

I had

very much hoped to receive a letter from M. Gaillard and the

,

.

letter of M. Dourges-Maunoury has been entered only because
it indicates that Gaillard planned to write.

His unfortunate

death this spring, however, came before he was able to reply
and closed the door on the possibility of discovering his
impressions of the good offices mission.

Of the men whose

letters I considered to be of greatest value,

~he

political

positions of Jacque Soustelle and Andr' Norice have already
been indicated in the text.

Christian Pineau was, at the

time, the Socialist Minister of Foreign Affairs.

L~on

Delbecque was a Gaullist on the staff of Jacque Chaban
Delmas, the Minister of Defense.

He provided a link between

the discontented military chiefs and the revolutionary French

in Algeria.

Andre/ Philip was a Socialist and a devoted

"European"; Pierre Pflimlin was also a "European" and chair
man of the Movement r6publicain populaire (MRP).

He pulled

together a short-lived government in May that stepped aside
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for de Gaulle after the crisis of May 13.
The questions to which the Frenchmen responded were as
follows:
1) Should the unpopular reception of the good of
fices mission be attributed entirely to French atti
tudes whi.ch predated the bombing of Sakiet (in par
ticular, the suspicion that thB United States would
attempt to involve itself in the Algerian situation,
a ~trictly French problem), or did the image of Mr.
Murphy himself influence French opinion of the good
offices? Were his activities from the Occupation
period remembered? Did his appointment serve to con
firm doubts about the mission? Did it create new
doubts? Might someone else have engendered more
confidence?

2) Had the good offices mission been handled dif
ferently, or had someone other .than Mr. Murphy repre
sented the United States, might the Gaillard Govern
ment have resolved its differences with Tunisia?
Could it have eventually solved the Algerian problem?
Can Mr. Murphy or the good offices mission reasonably
be held responsible for contributing, directly or
indirectly, to the fall of the Fourth Republic?
Herve Alphand is an exception.

He was the French Ambassador

to the United States and Dulles had conferred with him about
the Sakiet bombing.

I was curious to know whether Dulles

had discussed various possible candidates with him before
making the Murphy appointment.
however, Dulles had not.

As his letter indicates,

From Murphy I wanted to know

(1), how he came to be appointed, (2), how he felt at the
outset of the mission about its value and its probable suc
cess, and (3), whether he believed that groups on the Right
were also involved in arousing anti-Americanism in France at
the time of the good offices mission.
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FRAN<;AISE.

DES

AFFAIRES

ETRANGERES

PARIS, I.E

1 3 t·1A11970

•

.,AA.,.

Monsienr,
Par lettre du 10 mars 1970, vous m'avez pose, a
propos de votre travail sur tl. hobert fJiurphy et sa mission
en Tunisie en 1958 i diverses questions concernant l'attitude
du gouvernement frangais a l'epoque. VOllS desiriez en particuliel
savoir si Ie e;ouvcrnement frD.n<;ais avait ete consu1te au sujet
de 1e designl::ltion de M. Murphy et que1les avaient ete ses
reactions.

J'ai l'ho~qeur de vou~ faire savoir que Ie gouvernement
frangais n'a pas ate consulte par Ie gouvernement des Etats-Unis
avant 1 a nomina t.; ion ,~e iii. Murphy at done qu I il n I a pas eu a
se poser les diff&ren~es questions mentionnees dans votre lettre.
Veuillez agreer, I~ionsieur, 1 t assurance de ma conside
ration distinguee.j.

M. Lorin Anderson

18}1 S.W. Park Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201

STATE
U.S.A.

PORTL~D

m~IVE~SITY

t-IINISTERE
DE l'EOUCA nON NATIONAlE
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6, rue de Tournon. 6' (Meet, 39·00)
( et 85046)

ECOLE PRA TIGUE
DES HAUTES ETUDES
Selence. [conomlquea et Soclole.
Centre de Soclolog;e I::uropeenne

Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY
Division of Social science
p. O. Box '151
PORTLAND, ORE 97207 !USA

Cher Monsieur,
J'ai bien re91 votre lettre du 10 mars.
nlest pas facile de donner une reponse categorique
aux deu:", questions que vous me posez; les remarques wivantes
traduisent mes impressions de l'epoque et rien de plus; de
toute maniE~re, la mission de M. Murphy n 'aurait pas r6ussi
p:rrce que l'opinion fJ.'aw;aisc souP90nnait les Etats-Unis d'inter w
venir dans Paffairc algerienne, consideree comme concernant
exelusivUlnent la Frcil1Ce. La personnalite de M. MUHPIIY creait
un obstacle sUj)plementaire sur la. voie du succes, en raison
du rOle qu'll avaH jou€: pendant la guerre et de ses relations
avec Ie Gouvernemellt de Vichy. Cependant, i1 ne s 'agit la
que d 'un detail sans grande importance.
D'aucune manlE':!re Ie gouvernement Gaillard
n 'aurait pu regler Ie probleme d 'Algerie.

n

Croyez. je vous prie, a l'assurance de mes
sentiments devoues.

fLay') ~Raymond ARON .

..
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VIII~

Ie 16 Avril 1970

Monsieur Lorin Anderson
1831 S. W. Park Avenue
Apparte;.nent 507
POR'l'LAND
Oregon 97201

U. S.A.

Monsieur,
J'ai bien regu votre lettre du 31 mars
dernier , je l'ai transmise it mon ami Felix Gaillard q'.li etait President
d'J. Conseil a l'epoque des b::ms offices at q'li est a meme de rcpo:1dre
a vos questions d'uue maniere plus precise que moi-meme •
Je
mes sentiments les meilleurs .

VOliS

prie de croire , Monsieur

t

a
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LltON DELBECQi..!E
31, RuF. DU POINT C£NTR"L

La 25

A~

1970

89-TOURCOING

Monsieur' LORIN J..r.rnERSON
1831 S.W. Perk-Avenue
App. 507 PORTHAND
OREGON 91 201
U.S.A.

Char V.onsieur,

En ~ponse a. vo1:ra J.ettre, ve\l:i.l.J.ez 1:rouver ci-apres
queJ.quos notes concernan1: J.a mission -bons offices· do Monnieur
MURPHY en 1958.
La personneJ. parJ.ementa.ire at, bien entendu, J.es min:i.s
tres se Douvena.:i.en1: du rOJ.e qule:va.it joue Nonsieur MURPlfY, en
1942, en Uriqua du Nord. Llopinion pUbJ.ique J.lavaii; oubJ.ie.
Ce n I est donc pa.s J.a presenoe de, )\lODS ieur 1·;uRPHY a J.a td'te de J.a
mieaian de bona oi"f'i.oes. qui explique J.a m.~ :f'iance d I u."'lO partie
de J.topin:ion pubJ..ique e1: J.lhoGtllita dtune autre partie e. J.le
gard de cEd;'l;e mission.
Bien avant J.e bombardement de SAKIET, J.a pJ.upart des
ha.n9e.is considera.:ient Honaieur BOURGUIBA - qui hebergeai1: en
Tunisia uno forte ar~e du F.L.N. oJ.ger:ien et J.n:isse.it cotta
armee attaquer J.es noaitions fra.n~a.iaeB de J.a frontiers - comma
J.a oompJ.ioe e.u m':lins passif de J.a rebellion aJ.gerienno. En fai.t,
Monsieur BOURGUIBA etait m3me aoouse de bellig6ranoe. Il'impor
tait donc peu que oe rot r'Ionsieur mJP..PHY qui :inter'rlnt dnns J.e
differend franoo-tunisien. Ii I importe queJ. aut::-e mediateur aura.it,
dons J.es oirconstanoea d1aJ.ors, susoite dee reactions sombJ.abJ.es.

IJ. est difficiJ.e de d~re a~, d~fferemmant menee, J.a
mission :r.iI1RPHY-BEELEY aurait reusai a. apa.i.ser J.aquerelle i'ranco
tun:is~onno. Llun des probJ.emea eB8ent~p~s etait en ei"£et ~e re
tabJ.isaement d I una situn.tion normale e. J.a frontiere. I'lona~eur
MURPHY ne pouvai.t resoudre un te~ probJ.eme aJ.ors que Honeieur
BOURG-UIBA J.u.i-~me en eta.it ~nca;pabJ.e. On ne Toit dono pa.s oom
ment uue mission de bons offioes aurai.t pu eviter de buter sur
oe point.
. IJ. est certain en outre que J.' :intervention de I,Jl;t. MURPHY
et BEELEY f'ut :interpretee en Franoe oomma une tentat~ve sourno:Lse

•.•1•..
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d t inter:na.tiona.l.isa-;iotl du oon£1.it eJ.gerieno L t opinion, dans sa
majoritt;, se rebe:Llai:'c oontre uno intrusion etrangere dana une
a:ff'aire qui, pour elle, ctait une affaire interieure fran<;aiso
these dta~leurs soutenue avec persevGranoe devant ltO~N.Uo par
les representants du Gouvernemento
Prise en oe sens, on doit admettre qua

~a

mission MURPHY

a. preoipita 10, ohutf) de ].a Qu.'l.trie:r.o Repub1ique" En slaooroohani:
a. olle, Honsieur F6],i:r. GAILLARD a. en e i'i'et donne 1 t impression que,
m.a1 reso.lu a m:..inten:i.r la souve!"'air.ete i'ra..'1Qai se sur l ' Algerie, U

s t engageait par un detour dans la voie de 1 t abandon at de l'inter
dependanoe dans .le dOl.1aine des A:i:faires Etrangoreso Deja, au sur
plus, oenai.ns mil.ieu.x politiques envisageaient le retour du Gene
raJ. de GAlI"LLE qui PI?Z eai t pour un farms partisan de l ' Algerie
f'ranQaise et de l'Ind~penda.noo nationale.
I
En oonclusion t la mission de Ivlonsieur HURPRY f'Ut un des
~lemento qui perroirent J.taccfltration du prooessus de regroupement
des dii'i'erents oourants Hatio::laux et aussi la chute du Gouverne
ment GAILLARD. Le vide politique et la g;rande orise qui s'en sui
vit f'irent le reste.
Esperant que cas elementa TOUS aideront dans votre tra.
vo.il., je vous prie d'agreer~ Char Nonoieur, l l ex;pression de mes
~entiments distingues.

UNtVERSITI! DE PARIS

FONDATION NATIONAI.E
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DES

SCIENCES POI.ITIQUES

CYCLE SUPJ::RIEUR D'i;':TUDES POLlTI9UES

C".ner Nonsieur,
Je voua r~:,:,:,rc'.e d~ votr!! lettre. J' aVOn!! qu.e co que je dir:: d1:!1ls mon
H-,re !Jur 1n DIO Re:mbliqc;o 'Jot r.·lue 'h~,"?oth?t.iq1le r.U.C v1:rifi6. n fr·udrdt ff':i.re
une etude d';? prc~$:c at qu·:-lz:r.t~s i.n.tcrvie~"s de pe1"~$o:·'!;alitC:s.
l'~n tout c,~.c, j'ai encore rodit 1:: r:on cours cette a:'nee Que je
creyeis offectivO":C!1t ~~le J.c: sctlvt!!1ir des man":'r:?',',res de r. I·iU1.~'1Y en i (H2 En'C'it
eM un mndic:l.p OU01!,l~r::entdre !:lour la mbsion de bons offices.

Votl"e dcu:.'!:ic:;;e (IU(Hltton 11e P?U'; rccevoir una r6[.onsc nct'cc. ~::1 en ost
r~~\1i,t =n..!.'x hY:?Ot!lt:::-~S. ~Te 1')') ~~!":':!~ts

de vous rer..vl'):~er AU c~;J1tre uJlJ,.,,,:6ric" d~..,s ::ton

livre sur In Politjr:ut') sxt:Sricurc de III VO RC::Hlb1.i'1ue. Je VOUO rnppclle ci.~'pl,~nent
<luP. Ie conflit I::.vec -i:>. Ttmi::;i~ a 6te ar.aise, d:c::s 10 !lens scur.eite !l,:;,.r ;.;. G.ULLARD,
de::; l'arriv,;o du G:?n6rd de Gnulle au pOllvoir.
FiMltt'lont m:l

r'~ronse

a votrc

toute dernicre question e:Jt un oui

ties forme.
Je VO'lD prie de creire, cher

Nonsi~r,

a roes

rneilleurs

t/frAlfred G?OSSER

0.' • •

r,o:-in Y-:Y·;;so:r

1

1831 S;:l. Fa!'k Avenue, Apt 1= '507
1\.":';'1,;\

U.S.A.

"I),

Oree;on

97201

S(;!:tj!~cnts.

COMPAGNIE
PAHIS, Ie

12 Nai 1970

lOtS

MESSAGERIES MARITIMES
12. BOUI..EVARO DE I..A MADEI..EINE

Cher r'.onsicur,
'Je m'excuse de ne pas avoir repondu plUB
tat a votre lettre iu 31 Nars 1970, mais je ne
reviens que maintonant d'un grand voyage en
Afrique du Sud.
S1, du fait des fonctions que j'ai
exercees au 1':aroc, je. suis assez competent en ce
qUi concerne les affaires cnerifiennes, je ne Ie
suis P,lS du tout en oe qui concerne les affaires
tunisiennes.
Ce que je crois c'est que Ie choix de
}!onsieur Nurphy a I' epoque de Sakiet n' a pas ete
heureux. 11ais ce que je crois .§galement c I est que,
de toute fa90n, aucur. des gouvernements de la
IVe Republique n'aurait etc capable, autrement
que p~r l'octroi de l'independance, de regler
l'affaire tunisienne.
Le Maroc et Ie Tunisie ayant obtenu leur
i.ndependance, le·p:cobleme de l'affaire a'Algerie
ne pouvait pas ~tre a mon avis regIe autrement
qu'il lla ete. L'exceptionnel merite du General
de Gaulle est d'avoir pu accord~r son indopendance
a l'Algerie sanR qulil en resulte en mctropole des
troubles extr~~ement graves, tout en adoptant des
dispositions ~ui ont permis de regler dans les
moins mauvaises conditions possibles Ie tres
serieux probleme du reclassement, en metropole,
des fran~ais d'AIgerie.

\'

Je voua prie d1agreer, cher ~~nsieur,
l'express1on de mes sentimentsd~stingucs et les
meil·leurs.
'-..." \
Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON
1831 S.~1. Park Avenue, Apt., 507
PORTLAlm
Oil.LGm~ 97201

U.S.A.

.

Gilbert Grandval.
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CON.EIL

LA DOROOGH.
MtNISTRIE

D'AZERA."f

RL/CA

.Cher t-lonsieur,
Les

qu~stions

que vous me posez dans votre

lettre du 31 Mars ne sont pas de mon ressort.
Fortoment r ... tenu
concr(~

a

ALGER par les oxigences

tes d 'une terrible charga:- faire vivre at acheminer

vers la paix un pays de IO millions d'habitants rorme
de communautes ethniques violemment opposees, je ntai
pas connu la mission MURPHY.
M. MURPHY 'tait en rapport direct avec Ie Presi
dent du Conseil des Hinistres, H. Felix GAILLARD ~e
Ministre des Af'faires Etrangeres; il a vUten plus/de nom
breuses personnalites de son choix.
Peut-otre aurait-il pu me rencontrer avec
profit pour lui et pour moi. II ne l'a pas fait. Je Ie
regrette at me suis demand' alors si les raisons de son
attitude ue devaient pas Ihre recherchees dans une igno
rance voulue de certains aspects de la realite Algerienne
et un parti pris delibere.
Veuillez agreer, Cher Monsieur, avec mes
sincures regrets, l'expression de mes sentiments tres
. distingues.

Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON
1831 S.W Park Avenue, Apt • .507
PORTLAND- OREGON 97201

Office· Universitaire de Recherche Socialist~Og
86, rue de Lllie

-

PARIS (7.)

•

Tel. 555.08.60

Paris, le 23 avril 1970

Cher Monsieur,
J'ai bien re~u votre lettre et regrette
vive.ment de ne pouvoir vous apporter quelque
information valable dans votre enquete.
Je n'appartenais pas au gouvernement de
l' ~poque et n' ai pas ete info·rme des difficultes
rencontrees par la mission de M. r-turphy.
Le seul jugement que je puisse formuler
en tan:t que parlementaire est qu'il ne serait ~as
raisonnable de tenir M. Murphy ou la mission s1 pau
que co Goit responsablc aans la. sulte des evenements
et plus particulierement dans la chute de la IV~me
Republique.
Veu1llez croire, cher Monsieur, en mes
meilleurs sentiments.
tr~s

Guy MOLLET

Monsieur Lorin ANDERSON
1831 S.W. Park Ave, Apt 507
PORTLAND, Oregon 97201
(U.S.A.)

ANORl't

MORICE

"10 avril 197 0._
Centre Elysee:; Bretagne
4, avo FrarJdir.. R~'osc"clt, 8erne.
PARIS. LE"
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Cher 1.10nsieur,
Jlai lu av(~c interet votre lettre du 31 mars 1970.
Je veux bien reSpondrc brn~vement, de mon mieux, aux questions
que vous posez.
Tout d'abord, je suis un ami des Etats-Unis d'Amerique
et ai toujours souhait~ que lea relations entre la France et les Etats
Unis se situcnt 8U.' Ie plan de la plus grande a:miti€. Jc suis alle a
plusicurs reprises aUK Etats-Unis, recemment encore - i1 y a 3 mcis
et je m'y trouve toujours dans des "milieux particulit-rement sympa
thlques. Done ce que je vais eairerepcut 4Hre tax':; d'inamiti~ cnvers
lea Etats-Unis, alors que je me sens tres attache au peuple ameri
cain,
Voyons rpaintenant Ia reponse.
Si la mission de bons offices de M. Murphy s'eat
traduite par un llchec, eela n' est pas cla, seion moi, a ia person
naiite mame de M. Murph,-, personnalite que nous n'avons pas II
discuter. S1 un autre que M. Murphy cut etc place a la tete de cettc
delegation, il n'eut pas fait mieux.
Lea FranlSais, et j'etais du nombre, ant mal pris
l'immixt1on des Etats-Unis dansune a!.faire qui etait considerce
a l'epoque comme une affaire fran~aise. N'oublions pas que cela
venait apl'Qs une politique maladroite des Etats- Unis en Indochine,
ou, au lieu d'aider les Fran;;ais, les Amerieains ont complique de
leur mieux tous le·s problemes, alors qu'il etait de notre interl!t
comm'.1n de travailler ensemble. En ce qui cone erne le Viet-Nam,
et la suite ddes t;venements Pa prouve, les Americains ayant
travaille is. chasser les Fra..'l<;ais d'Indochine, s'y sent installes et
ont heritc de toutes les dHficultes presentes.

... /

/

no.

...

Meme maladresse americaine dans l'affaire de Suez.
Je mien suis d'ailleurs explique al'epoque avec l'adjoint au Secre·
taire d'Etat a Washington. Si, '1U lieu d'exercer cette pression sur
les F'ran'iais et les Anglais pour les faire abandonner l'expedition.
on nous.avait laisse les 1'T'.ains libres qu(;>lques jours encore, non
seulement le problezne Nasser etait regIe, mds aussi Ie probleme
de l'Algerie franyaise. Au lieu de cela, les Americains ont fait
pression sur nous pour nous faire la.cherl'expedition en son beau
milieu, Quvrant ainsi la porte aux difficultes au Moyen-Orient que
nous connaissons depuis.
Nous savions bien, en ce qui cc>ncerne l'Algede, que
les formules de jad:s n'etaient plus valables et qu'il faudrait en
arriver a un accord. Mais tout ceci eut pu lltre fait sur une distance
de plusieurs annees au lieu d'@tre precipite et se traduire finalemmt
par de la honte et du sang.
Dans 1a mission Murphy, ce n'est pas M. Murphy qui,
personnellement, porte toutes les Tesponsabilites. crest Ie fait
m@me de cette mission qui a ,he une intrusion dans nos (),ffaires
frant;aises et qui, tout ell declarant qu'il .s'agissait d'arranger lea
choses, n'a fait, au contraire, que les compliquer en precipitant
les eve-nements et en faisant passer l'affaire d'Algerie et de 1a
Tunisie du plan frant;ais au plan international au tout ne pouvait
que se dissoudre.

repolldront.

Voila quelques renseignemcnts qui, je
demande.

a \'otre

l'esp~re,

Pour conclure vous me demandez si 1a mission de
M. Murphy a contribue direr.tem~nt ou inc1irectement a la chute
de la IVe Re publique. Je pense qulil serait injuste de faire porter
cotta respollsabilite a M. Murphy. La mi!lsion Murphy a cte, si
vous Ie voulez, un element de ph~s qui a contrib";le a l'avenement
de 1a Ve Republique en France, mais elle n'en a pas etc l'el~ment
motour ou determinant.

Je vous prie d'agreer, cher Monsieur. l'assurance de
mes sentiments les plus distingues.

Monsieur Lorin Anderson
1831 S. W. Park Avenue, Apt•
Portland, Oregon 972.01

.-f-:
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1970

Mr. Lorin Anderson
Portla.~d State University
P.O. Box 751
Portland, Oregon 97207

Dear Mr. Anderson:
I take pleasure in ackno.rledging the receipt of your un
dated letter addressed to me at my Washington address, which I
have just received.
I am glad to answer the questions you put as follows:
1) I came to be appcinted to the task. of U.S. represen
tative to. a scod ot'fi.(',.,~ te:m consisting of Sir Harold Beeley of
the British Foreign Office a.nd myself, because the French Govern
ment had requested such an Anglo-American Good Offices mission
after the French Airforce had. bonbed the Tunisian vilage of Side
Sakiet. At the t:L"'lle rr~ job was Deputy Un,der Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Department of state, VIashington, and I was
designated for this task by the then Secretary of State, Dulles,
and President Eisenhower.
2) Our Government was rather reluctant to assume this
responsibility as that type of task is rather thankless. As in
the case of most disputes a mediator enjoys the opportunity to
be attacked by both parties

3) . Actually some :;nembers of the Gaullist group in addi
tion to the Commun5st element ,·'cre vigorously opposed to foreign
intervention in the matter. On my arrival in Paris I remember
being greeted by a scorching nei'ispaper article wit.h a byline by
Michel Debre, subsequently Gaulli3t Prime l'linister, saying in
effect tl'l..at Sir Harold and I 1'rere unwelcome volunteers and the
best thing we could do would be to return home leaving the French
to settle their c.m affairs. Up to that point they had not been
very successful.
I might add that i f yOUI library happens to have a copy

fo.1r. Lorin Anderson

February 12, 1970

- 2 -

of It book I wrote called "Dip1omr:>.t Among Warriors~ it conta.ins an
account of the ~unisian affair in Chapter Z7.
With kind

regaxd~.

•

Sincerely yours,

RM:1b

112

113'

PP/Me
PIERRE PF"LIMLIN

BT ..A.&BOURQ.

_ ..... u • •"ULe•

........... D • • T ........ OU ..O

L.

13 avril 1970

P . . . . . D.NT O. LA CO....... N .. UT. "'......N.

Cher Monsieur,

J'ai bien rec;u votre lettre du 31 mars par laquelle vous Ole
demandez des rensfdgnements, sur la mission confiee en 1958 a M. Robert
Murphy.
Je ne dispose que de tres pau de renseignements sur cctte
affaire car les problemes en question ne relevaient pas, a 1'epoque, de ma
competence gouvenlementale. C'est donc uniquement en me basant sur Ie
souvenir que j 'ai garde de propos recueillis a l'epoque et, sous tout~
reserv~lque je puis faire a vos deux questions les reponses suivantes :,
1) Le prL'1cipe m~me d'une intervention des Etats-Unis dans
l'affaire tunisienne etait conteste pa r de nombl'eux hommes politiques
f!'anc;ais et au sei.n me me au Gouvernement. A tort ou a raison beaucoup
de gens pensaiem que l'influel1ce des Etats-Unis dans les affaires
d'Afrique du Nord risquait de s'exercer au detriment des inter~ts franc;ais
tels qu10n les concevai.t a J.'epoque. Je ne crois pas que la persolmalite
de M. Murphy ait etc a cet egard un facteur determina.nt.

2) 11 est difficile d'irnaginer comment les evenements auraient
evolue si la mission de "bons offices" 'entre la France et la Tunisie avait
ete admise par Ie GOllvernement franc;ais et si eUe avait abouti a un
resultat favorable. Personnellement je ne crois pas que, m~me dans l'hypo
these la plus favorable, la cri.se algerienne aurait pu etre evitee. 11 me
paraft inconcevable que l'on puisse tenir M. Murphy ou Sa mi,ssion comme
responsable d'avoir contribue,directement ou indirectement, a la chute
de la IV. Rcpubl ique.
Veuillez agreer, cher lIiIonsieur, l'assurance de mes
sentiments les meilleurs.

Mr. Lorin ANDERSON
1831 S. W. Park Avenue, Apt.
POHTLAND
Oregon 97201
(U. S.A.)
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Paris, le 8 Avril 1970

Lc President,

Cher Monsienr,
I I m'est difficile de vous donner des renseignements
sur une question que je n'si pas suivie de pres ct qui est,
par ailleurs, fort lointai.ne.

D'ur.e faqon generale, il est certain que l'idee
meme de la mission de bons offices americains en 1958
a suscite une resistance dans l'ensemble de l'opinion
publique frangaise, a la seule exception de ceux q\ti'
qui etaient hostiles a In poli tiquc f:r'an9aise en Algerie.
Faisant suite a l'intervencion americaine, lors de l'expe~
dl.tion de Suez, cela apparaissait comme une intervention
imperialiste des Etats-Unis, dans Ie domaine de la politique
mediterraneenne qui est, essentiellement, de competence
europeenne.
I;a designation de Mr. Murph"v a ete un facteur
d'aggravation, car tous ceux d'entre nous qui ont ete
en Algerie avec la France combattante, ont considere
r.'r. !,~urph;t ,'t11!l-':'! un adversaire de la .F'rance dont les contacts'
essentials dans 1e pa."s etaient les groupes sociaux qui
avaient, prealablemenc, col1abore avec les Allemands •. Maia,
je ne crois pas que ce facteur, quelque deaagreab1e qu'il
fut, ait ete decisif. Je crois qu'a ce moment la aucune
intervention exterieure a l'Europe n'aurait pu jouar un
role posi tif •.
Veuillez
sentiments.

Monsieur Lorin Anderson
·1831 S.W. Park Avenue, Apt.
Portland, Oregon'97201'

U.S.A.

~

croire, cher Monsieur, ames mei11eurs

ffL,rz
Andre Philip
507

Christian PI~~AU
55. rue Val'lt)au

Paris. le 10 avril 1970

PARIS (7·)

Monsieur Lorin A!IDEHSON
1831 S.W. Park Ave •• Apt 507
PORTLAND, OREGON 97201

CMr Monsieur,
J'ai bien re~u votre lettre d~ 31 mars et vous prie
de trouv~r en reponse une petite note sur 1a mission de M. MURPHY.
Je crois sincerement qu'e11e correspond a 1a rea1it6 historique.
Je reste a votre disposition pour tous renseignements
complementaires.
Croyez, cher Monsieur, ames meilleurs sentiments.
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NOTE sur 1a missi?n ce M. MURPHY dans l'affaire
algero-t~nisienn8

I - 11 est certain que 10. mission de M MURPHY (mission part agee avec
un homologue britannique) a etc, en 1958, ffial accueillie par une partie de l'opinion
publique

fran~aise.

La reticence

a son

egard tie-nt

a deux

causes principa1elO

I

a) sa persoqnalite
b) la situation po1itique du moment.
a) Les milieux gaullistes avaient conserve de M. MURPHY et de son activite

a Alger

un assez mauvais souvenir. 11s lui pretaient une attitude hostile

a la

personne du general, dm fait qu'il ctait Ie representant du President Roosevelt
at que son activite personnelle aV8it ete jugee, en 1944, favorable au General
GIRAUD. 11 est interessant de souligner l'hostili te particuliere de M. Michel DEBRE
qui etait cense, en

19~8,

representer l'opinion du General de GAULLE, contre Ie

fait que la mission des bons offices ait

et~

confiee

a M.

MURPHY.

On peut done considerer que Ie choix de ce dernier a ete maladroit,
encore que tout autre choix aurait comporte lui aussi des reserves.
b) Les me~es milieux gaullistes sa pronon~aiont avec force, en 1958,
pour l'Algerie frant;aise, contre ee qu'Us appelalent la "complicite tunisienne"
avec Ie F.L.N., et pour l'exercice du "droit de suite", c'£-st a dire pour l'auto
risation donnee aux troupes fran~aises de poursuivre les rebelles algeriens sur Ie
territo1re tunisien ( ce qui a ete fait a Sakhiet).
La mission de:> "bons offices It leur semblai t aloTs une atteinte

a la

souverainete fran<;;«ise, sous la forme d'une intrusion .anglo-americaine dans une
affaire consideree comme d'ordre purE:'ment national.
U'autre part les gaullistes avaient toujours denonce une soi-disant
volonte des Etats-Uni~ de supplanter la France en Algerie. Ce qui a pu donner
nalssance a cette supposition, c'est Ie fait qu'a maintes reprises des dirigeants
amerieains ont manifeste leur crninte de voir l'Un10n Sovietique prendre pied en
Algerie, Ie jour ou les Frant;aiS seraient partis, hypothese qutlls consideraient
comma vraisemblable.
L'e16ment paradoxa! de cette affaire reside dans Ie doublo )eu du
Glneral de GAULLE; Celui-c1 ffi'avalt personnellement coufie, en octobre 1957 ,
.

.../ ...

2.
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qu t i l eta it partisan de l'indepcncance de I 'Algerie I mais 11 cor..ptait, pour prendre
Ie pouvoir, sur l'appui deS tenants de l'AIg6rio fram,ai,se. I.'exporience a verine
l'existence de ce double jeu.
II - 5i 18 mission

dEn;

"bens affices" s'etait exetcee dans d'autres conditions

et avec d'autres hor.nes, Patrai.r!;: algedenn""

Qt

par voi(! d,e consequence Paffaire

tunisienne, n'auraient pas ete resolues pour autant. Le Gouvornement GAILLARD etait
condamne, comc.e ses predecesseurs. parce que les
dtAlgerie encore

q~'ils

fran~ais

etaient las cia la guerra

fussent divis's sur son issue possible.

Les uns louhaitaient une solution de forca qUi aurait consolide la
presence franljai se sans tenir coo.pte des aspirations des populations musulrn'lnes.
Les au trsos etaient parti,«Hl!1 de l' abandon pur ot si:npl,e, negligeant ainsi les
interHs des 1.200.COO habi tants d I

or~gine

europ.5enne qui. vi vaient en Alg{;rie.

, Au Parlement. gaullistes et cOIlll'llvnistes votaient, ensp.mble contre les
gouvernements

a la

recherche d'un juste milieu.

Dans de telles concti tions, 1a IVeme R,'publ1que etai t paralyse", dans son
fonctionnement.
11 seral t done injuste et exeessif d ' irr.j.)uter ~ 1a seule mission de
M. MURPHY une chute II peu pres im?vitabh. Il y a dans l'Histoire des catalyseurs
qu1 prckipitent une evolution mais qui ne sont pas responsables du resultat final.

"Les IO£ES
los HOMMES,
Les FAITS"
s.c. avenue do tlcu:U,.
92-NEUlllY·SUiI.j;;£INE

Neu/Uy, Ie

'1
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Mr. Lorin ANDERSON
1831 S.W. Park Avenue, Apt. 507

'4':,: 'I2l',$4,10

PORTLA!!D, Oregon 97201

U.S.A.

Cher Monsieur,
J'ai bien r!'!';l1 votre lettre du 10 mars et clest bien
voJ.ont.iers ~e' jlessaierai de repondre succinctl?ment a voa ques
tions. Je desire mer.tionner auparav,mt que m~s relations person
neJ.J.es £.vec Robert l·l'.lrphy sont cordiales et que j' ai encore (,u
le plaisir de dejeu."ler at de converser longuement avec lui a
New York 11 y a quelque temps.
lere Question Z Je crais que l'attitude d lUll grand nom
bre de roembres du Parlement et de moi-meme a l'egard de la mis
sion dite de "bons offices" apres Sakiet procedai't avant tout de
1Ii~'itation ressentie par beaucoup devp~t llincocpr~~ensi,n de
nos allies dans 1 I affaire algerienne. Les campa€;nes de pre3D'J
pro-F.L.N. aux Etata-Onis, l'o.ccueil favorable r1serve a J:3W YO:til
awe chefs terroristcs, certains discours comma celui du senatolll'
et futur president J .J? Kenned.y, la politique di te lIant.i··colol'\ia~
lis-te" P~'~chge 11. \iashin!1:ton et a Londres, pr0voquaient en France
de vives inquittuc!.es. Aussi bli1Lnait-or. le g01.l:....ernement Gaillard
de donner :;.' impression o..u'::..l s I en l'emettait, pour traitel' U.l'l pro
bleme de cette importance, So des al'bi·tres dont I' orientation
eo.nnue paraissai t fixe9 d 'a:vance. La personne de 1-1. Hurphy n'e
'tait pas en cause (sauf peut-~tre chez certnins gaulllstes qui
lUi reprocn.ale-nt encore sa politique en 1942-43) t mais bien plu
tat celle du Eritannique rI. Beeley, dont les tenda"lces systema
tiquement pro·-arabes n' etaient pas ignorees.
2eme Question: L1enisode de la mission des bons offices
a
finalement d'import~~ce mineul'e. Le gouvernement Gaillard
n'aurait pas pu, avec ou sans cette mission, faire face a la si
tuation en Afrique du l:ord. La deterioration du systeme politi
que fran~ais e. cette epoque etai t bien trop profonde et irreme
diable. Il serait done excessif et injust€ d'attribuer une res
ponsabilite directe ou indirecte a N. Hurphy .)u a la mission dana
la chute du regime. Celui-ci se sel'ait desagr~&e de toute m~~e
re en raisnn de ses contradictions internes et de son impuissancE
resoudre les problemes de lloutre-mer.

ete

a

./.

Veuillez agreer, cher Monsieur, l'assurance de mes
sentiment~

les

meille~rs.

.--

~~~
~ques

SODSTELLE)

.

119

